Unraveling the Golden Knot of Liberty


“If it were possible to take interest rates into negative territory, I would be voting for that.”

– Janet Yellen, February 2010

—“We do not exist in a physical world. Our “valuation system” exists in a fantasy world exempt from default (the death of fiat). In other words, political confidence in the system prevents systemic default because our most sacred contracts have an implied socialized guarantee. Confidence in this system depends upon “the favored” being bailed out by the “little people” at large. This system will get its “new name” years later in retrospect as the dust of its demise clears.

—Our “money” has no “time value”, therefore negative interest rates can be seen as either an outcome of that recognition or a necessary precursor to it. Confidence in the future utility of paper is the only real value that contracts hold, and all paper money is a futures contract.”—Trends and Events

What good is it to be free politically if the economic choices are deviously, only limited to the color of the debt ball-and-chain that you prefer? That digital-ball of National debt never shrinks and those chains of obligations only keep getting longer, with every hook of liability so attached. Compound interest on the aggregate of the debt is where the money swindle meets the road. If the system had been engineered to actually do Public Good, taxes in general would be unnecessary and rather redundant.

—[“Once you start to think of these numbers in family size numbers, it gives you a much better perspective of the magnitude of the irresponsibility in Washington,” he said.

“Every trillion dollars that we go deeper in debt is $8,000 of additional debt per family,” he explained. “And that is not a theoretical number. That is debt you owe just as surely as if it appeared on your credit card statement this month.”

The $19 trillion in debt translates to a $152,000 bill for the average family — and the national debt continues to increase.

The federal government is lucky that current interest rates are at historic lows — the official federal interest rate is 1.7 percent, according to the CBO. This translates to $250 billion in interest payments, which McClintock says costs each family $2,000.

“That means that $2,000 of the taxes that you paid to the IRS this year accomplished nothing more than renting the money we’ve already spent,” he told The DCNF.]—Each American family owes

The sum of all those federal and state induced, rented money-debts by “whatever source” upon the person is the modern day equivalent of forced, contractual indebtedness, only by new and improved, individually ranked and scored peonage. Technically, that debt-share needs to be the basis measure of the personal exemption amount for every U.S. citizen, in order for the feds not to be violating the Law. That would be the very Law they obviously have no intentions of enforcing, against themselves.

federal revenue

—“Payroll taxes are imposed by the federal and all state governments. These include Social Security and Medicare taxes imposed on both employers and employees, at a combined rate of 15.3% (13.3% for 2011 and 2012). Social Security tax applies only to the first $106,800 of wages in 2009 through 2011.[2] However, benefits are only accrued on the first $106,800 of wages. Employers must withhold income taxes on wages. An unemployment tax and certain other levies apply to employers. Payroll taxes have dramatically increased as a share of federal revenue since the 1950s, while corporate income taxes have fallen as a share of revenue. (Corporate profits have not fallen as a share of GDP).[2]”

The employee/employer is getting hammered on two major fronts— and the combination of these demands defines a specific quality of obedience. The do as we say or else—Master to serf–only now dressed as federal authority. This qualification of authority, to tax the U.S. citizen literally to death if need be, is the root of poverty itself. To whack the serfs into perpetual federal debt-peonage is easy when the rules are tilted to produce only that outcome. Working people who live on wages cannot sell “self-asset shares” to boost their self-incomes. Wage-slavery never went away the ‘cronies in charge’ just politically corrected the term so the truth didn’t sound nearly as bad as it really is by practice.

—[Apple CEO Tim Cook waved a magic wand in front of America on Tuesday, vanishing our outrage over how shamelessly companies avoid paying taxes, leaving the rest of us to foot the bill. As a public service to you, here is a chart that should enrage you about corporate tax rates all over again! (Story continues below chart of RAGE.)      The chart was produced for a September 2012 report (download-y PDF file) about corporate tax avoidance by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Walter Hickey of Business Insider helpfully republished the chart on Tuesday, in honor of Cook’s testimony before the same subcommittee. Update: The Senate lifted the chart directly from an earlier Tax Policy Center report about the sources of government revenue.

Cook was there to techsplain how Apple holding $102 billion of cash offshore isn’t really tax avoidance so much as good old fashioned ingenuity. Also, have you forgotten the shiny objects Apple makes (including the dreamy MacBook Air on which this here story was typed)? By the end of the hearing, Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) had demanded that Congress apologize to Apple for the inconvenience, and Sen. John McCain (R-My Lawn) was reduced to gently jibing Cook about how often he has to update his apps.]—Unfair tax system


The chart above illustrates perfectly how tax policy favors corporations rather substantially. This chart can also be called the chart of proof-positive, in your face superior influence. Not all corporations get the same preferential Rates, so it is wise not to judge them all the same or make any conclusions just yet. What this chart shows as well, is the glaring fact, this quality of advantage has been ongoing for decades on purpose. Nothing is ever by accident, especially whose pie is getting sliced and by what taxable proportion.

—“Ultimately, the only way to understand how much corporations are actually paying in taxes is to do the painstaking work that CTJ does in going through the financial reports filed by corporations, and uncovering the hidden tax breaks that go unnoticed in the large, error-prone databases that these other studies tend to rely on.

—The truth is that, by any measure, U.S. corporate income taxes are very low. And as a share of the economy, they are much lower than are corporate income taxes in almost every other developed country.”—Low corporate income taxes

When it comes to the Laws, which govern the Societies of Mankind, going back to the root of the Cause itself, illuminates the dark corners now forgotten. After all, who really decides what is Right and what is Good for the people so joined? These are not trivial questions to be ignored in the present time. If that which is Evil, has overtaken all that was once Good, then the Laws which govern society have failed. The measure of the failure is in the misery so suffered and those Natural Rights so capriciously swindled.

In the present, the greater body of people are treated as if those original Rights are nothing, but the remnants of meaningless, antiquated jargon. When the tyrants, standing upon their false claims of superior, soap-box authority, have nothing to fear, and nothing to lose when they “Hereby Impose” taxable obligations without end, no citizen aka peon is safe from their endless deprivations once uttered, this too shall be the Law.

By 1823, Thomas Jefferson among other Founders had already witnessed the destructive nature of an unbridled judiciary, stating as follows;

“At the establishment of our Constitutions, the judiciary bodies were supposed to be the most helpless and harmless members of the government. Experience, however, soon showed in what way they were to become the most dangerous; that the insufficiency of the means provided for their removal gave them a freehold and irresponsibility in office; that their decisions, seeming to concern individual suitors only, pass silent and unheeded by the public at large; that these decisions nevertheless become law by precedent, sapping by little and little the foundations of the Constitution and working its change by construction before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance. In truth, man is not made to be trusted for life if secured against all liability to account.”

When the Supreme Court ceased upholding the inalienable Rights of the working man, no matter what Congress, or its inferior parties and agents may claim, America was no longer a Nation of just Laws. Corporations do not labor for their Incomes or shed any artificial sweat to stay alive. The value of Time for one is never the same as the other and all taxes are notoriously political not scientific. Justice requires the recognition that human value is always personal, messy and often quite illogical. Money makes people act irrational and the taxing laws aggravate that condition on purpose. The system needs people to be confused so that they will mistrust the convictions of others unlike themselves.

—“The Rules of Procedure “unconstitutionally” installed in the U.S. Justice system in 1946 made it possible for lawyers to alter or abolish Natural Rights in their Common Law by simply legislating against them, ruling them out of existence from the bench, or ordering them out of force from the Executive Branch.

—Since then, American Law Schools have not taught Natural Law of Constitutional Law. Instead, they have focused on how to infringe upon the Natural Rights of every American by using precedence and procedure found only in Common Law. They had granted themselves the power to change law, the Constitution and the Bill of Natural Rights, by merely “setting a new precedent” or blocking public access to the proper justice system via “procedures of the courts.

—As a result, very few if any lawyers alive today know any of the truths presented in this essay on the subject of Natural Law and natural born. Further, even fewer want to know these truths and almost none of them want the American people to know this historic truth.”— A Natural Born Citizen is a True Citizen

By removing Natural Law and the study of Constitutional law, from the educational “system” and blocking any attempt by True Citizens to defend themselves from the over-reach of civil-servants with bad intentions, the imposed result is always a financial peon by any name. The punitive impositions only antagonize an already over-stressed general population, ensuring that most people, will remain politically polarized on specific issues, which are already strategically mapped out for mass-cultural control.   A Nation can be disingenuously controlled more effectively, by what it hates, more so, than what it loves.

The IRS at its root cause, is a political spy agency to carry out financial espionage. The IRS rudely operates against individuals contrary to the spirit of American beliefs and their sense of personal accomplishments. Taft would claim—This is an agency that spies on American citizens, in order to better punish bad corporations for being evil.

Basically, the IRS is a diabolical form of monetary police— who are tasked with taking fiat “money” from “citizens” by any means possible, so provided by the asinine regulations written under the pen name of Congress incorporated. The enemy of the People, is using the apparatus to accomplish the economic goals– maximum extraction of internal revenue without giving itself away. Wherever, that black-hand rests its crony fingers, lies the trail of abuse of Natural Rights.

The deductive strategy rests on a simple observation: That black-hand wanted “its” money removed from the federal revenue streams by whatever means possible, therefore, the code reflects those demands, overtly disguised as needed, to accomplish that goal. The downward movement of the corporate revenue line (below 30%) is the glaring clue as to how much of this profit taking involved. Go have another look at those charts and ask the simple question: whose hand defeated the federal? Power is well demonstrated by the negative function. Whomever,  had the power to turn the law into its personal bitch, took that profit tax free.

—‘The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their revenue, by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon consumable commodities; the state not knowing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its subjects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which it is supposed in most cases will be neatly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable commodities upon which it is laid out. 3 Vol. page 331.’—

The United States was formed on a radical principle, that the People were no longer to be the Subjects of anyone else. Funding a government without putting the people in the poor-house meant keeping the powers of government well defined in their proper channels of enumerated authority. The taxing powers had to find harmony with the principles so defended, or the power itself is a fraud against the very People so entrusted. Were the Founding Fathers lying to their fellow Citizens about their actual intentions? There is no virtue in a lie filled with plenary power. The bitter fact is no form of taxing power has virtue, as all forms are poisonous to the freedoms of individuals so taxed. The men of that period knew all too well the abuses of unregulated taxation. So unless, they were total hypocrites they intended for that power to be well leashed to the rules so proscribed.

To shed some light on this unique qualification of what it meant to be a True Citizen, a review of the key points of citizenship is required. Political correctness had not yet shielded from plain view, back then, what is now hidden behind a facade of bureaucratic indifference to the plights of millions, struggling under the oppressive weight of never-ending, federal debt.

UScompiledstatutes1916Harvard 7_15.13.22

The following excerpts shed some light on the situation people face today, when attempting to assert their inalienable Rights:

§ 3946. (R. S. § 1992.) Who are citizens.

All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of the United States.

{Note the fact the citizen is not subject to the jurisdiction thereof, as a prerequisite for entry into the United States.}

Act April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27

I. In general.—The status of persons as citizens or aliens depends entirely upon the Constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress pursuant thereto. Johnson v. U. S. (1893) 29 Ct. CI. 1; Mackenzie v. Hare (1913) 134 Pac. 713, 165 Cal. 776, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 201.

All persons found within the limits of the government, whether their residence be permanent or temporary, are to be deemed citizens for jurisdictional purposes. Molyneaux v. Seymour (1800) 30 Ga. 440, 76 Am. Dec. 662; Keerl v. Keerl (1870) 34 Aid. 21.

A person born in England before 1775, and who always resided there, and never was in the United States, is an alien. Dawson v. Godfrey (1808) 4 Cranch, 321, 322, 2 L. Ed. 634.

Children born in a country, and continuing, while under age, in the family of the father, partake of his natural character as a citizen of that country. Shanks v. Dupont (1830) 3 Pet. 242, 245, 7 L. Ed. 000.

A person cannot be a resident of two states at the same time. Brent v. Armfield (C. C. 1835) Fed. Case. No. 1,833.

A man is not prevented from acquiring citizenship in a place to which he goes with the purpose of permanently residing there, and in which he votes, by the fact that his wife and children remained at his old home. Blair v. Western Female Seminary (C. C. 1864) Fed. Case. No. 1,486

Distinction between citizenship and electorship pervades the public law of the United States. (1857) 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 300.

In regard to the protection of our citizens in their rights at home and abroad, we have in the United States no law which divides them into classes or makes any difference whatever between them. (1859) 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 357.

A question as to status or citizenship arising in the United States is determinable by our own law; or, if it arose on the high seas, or anywhere out of the territorial jurisdiction of another country, it would be a question either under our own law or the public law, according to the circumstances under which the right was asserted or denied. (1867) 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 320.

A citizen is one who by birth, naturalization, or otherwise is a member of an independent political society called a “state” “kingdom,” or “empire,” subject to its laws, and entitled to its protection. Blank v. Pausch (1885) 113 111. 60.

An alien is one born without the allegiance of the commonwealth. Ainslie v. Martin (1813) 9 Mass. 456.

The noun “citizen” has been defined to be one who enjoys the freedom and privileges of a city; a freeman of a city, as distinguished from a foreigner, or one not entitled to its franchises; an inhabitant of a city; a townsman; a person, native, or naturalized, of either sex, who owes allegiance to a government and is entitled to reciprocal protection from it; one who is domiciled in a country, and who is a citizen, though neither native nor naturalized, in such a sense that he takes his legal status from such country.

In English law, the term (citizen) means an inhabitant of a city; the representative of a city, in Parliament. In American law, a citizen is one who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, has a right to vote for Representatives in Congress and other public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people; one of the sovereign people; a constituent member of the sovereignty, synonymous with the people; a member of the civil state, entitled to all its privileges. A person may be a citizen for commercial purposes, and not for political purposes. Greenough v. Board of Police Com’rs of Town of Tiverton (R. I. 1909) 74 A. 785.

2. Citizenship of states and of United States.—One may be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state. Sharon v. Hill (C. C. 1885) 26 Fed. 337; Nichols v. Same (C. C. 1899) 92 Fed. 1; Gardina v. Board of Registrars of Jefferson County (Ala. 1909) 48 South. 788; McDonel v. State (1883) 90 Ind. 320.

By the fourteenth amendment, citizenship in the United States is defined and is made independent of citizenship in a state, and the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution are such as belonging of rights to citizens of all free states, and those which in the constitution are secured to the people, either as against the action of the federal or of the state government. U. S. v. Hall (C. C. 1871) Fed. Case. No. 15.282.

An American citizen has two classes of privileges: (1) Those which he has as a citizen of the United States; and (2) those which he has as a citizen of the state where he resides. Ex parte Kinney (C. C. 1879) Fed. Cas. No. 7,825.

A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state wherein he resides. Myers v. Murray, Nelson & Co. (C. C. 1890) 43 Fed. 695, 698, 11 L. R. A. 216.

Citizenship, state and national, defined and distinguished. Hammerstein v. Lyne (D. C. 1912 ) 200 Fed. 165.

SEC.1.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following conditions, and not otherwise: —

SEC. 2.  Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any alien now residing within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States may be admitted to become a citizen on his declaring, on oath or affirmation, in one of the courts aforesaid, that he has resided two years, at least, within and under the jurisdiction of the same, and one year, at least, within the state or territory where such court is at the time held; that he will support the constitution of the United States; and that he does absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly by name the prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, whereof he was before a citizen or subject; and moreover, on its appearing to the satisfaction of the court, that during the said term of two years, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and when the alien applying for admission to citizenship, shall have borne any hereditary title, or been of any of the orders of nobility in the kingdom or state from which he came, on his moreover making in the court an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility, before he shall be entitled to such admission; all of which proceedings, required in this proviso to be performed in the court, shall be recorded by the clerk thereof.”—

{Here it is much more clear that aliens, while within the geographic United States were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. as opposed to any other foreign power, and as they were not yet a citizen of any Union State they were not afforded any such immunities or privileges of a true citizen, of that state.}

–The first clause of the fourteenth amendment made negroes citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside, and thereby created two classes of citizens. Cory v. Carter (1874) 48 Ind. 327, 17 Am. Rep. 738.

–The right of citizenship, as distinguished from alienage, is a national right or condition. It pertains to the confederated sovereignty, the United States, and not to the individual states. Lynch v. Clarke (N. Y. 1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.

–3. Colonials.—Where a person born in New York before July 4, 1776, remained an infant with his father in the city of New York during the time it was occupied by the British troops, and the father, who was a Royalist and adhered to the British government, left New York with the British troops, taking his son with him, and the son never returned to the United States, he was born a British subject and continued an alien. Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbor (1830) 3 Pet. 96, 99, 121, 7 L. Ed. 617.

–Where a person was born in New York after July 4, 1776, and before September 15, 1776, when the British troops took possession of the city of New York and adjacent places, his character during infancy followed that of his father, who adhered to the British government and left with the British troops, taking his son with him, subject to the right of disaffirmance after termination of infancy, and where he did not disaffirm he remained a British subject. Id.

–In revolutions like the American Revolution the right of election to remain British subjects or to acquire the character of American citizens exists, and one, by withdrawing from the country and adhering to the British government, never acquired the character of an American citizen. Id.

A person born in the colonies, but who left the country before the Declaration of Independence and never returned, is an alien. Id.

–The point of time at which the American ante-native ceased to be British subjects is the date of the Declaration of Independence. Id.

–All those, whether natives or otherwise, who adhered to the American states at the time of the treaty of peace of 1783, were virtually absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, while all those adhering to the British crown were subjects of that crown. Shanks v. Dupont (1830) 3 Pet. 242, 247, 7 L. Ed. 660.

The enabling act under which Nebraska came into the Union provided that the “inhabitants” of the territory were authorized to form for themselves a constitution and state government, and that, when formed in compliance with the provisions of the act, the president should issue his proclamation declaring the state admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states.

The act further provided that the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable should have the same force in the state as elsewhere. The “organic act” under which the territory was governed and the laws of the territory itself provided that only those who should vote and hold office were citizens of the United States or had declared their intention to become such. Held, that alien inhabitants of the territory did not become citizens by virtue of its admission into the Union, although such aliens participated in the formation of the state and constitution. State v. Boyd (1891) 31 Neb. 082, 48 N. W. 73

8. Colored persons.—Prior to the fourteenth amendment it was generally held that free negroes and mulattoes were not citizens and could not become citizens under then existing laws. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856)

The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico became citizens of the United States under the treaty of Guadalupe Hilalgo. U. S. v. Sandoval (I). C. 1912) 198 Fed. 539.

Indians and half-breed Indians do not become citizens of the United States by being declared electors by any one of the states. (1856) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 740.

Indians are not citizens of the United States, but domestic subjects. Id.

The uncontradicted testimony of a father that his children were born in California is sufficient proof that they are citizens of the United States. Thompson v. Spray (1887) 72 Cal. 528, 14 Puc. 182.

A witness was asked, “Of what country was your father a subject?” and he answered, “France—Paris.” Held, that this was too vague and unsatisfactory to prove the father, who lived many years in this country, and died here, was an alien. Torre v. .Teaman (1S99) 25 So. 800. 76 Miss. 898.

Though an American citizen was a minor when he removed to Canada, where his son was born, he had previously “resided” in the United States. State v. Jackson (1907) 65 A. 657, 79 Vt. 504.

Former statute.—The Act of 1802, providing that the children of persons who “now are” or “have been” citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the United States, be considered citizens of the United States, applied only to persons who were citizens

v. Shilling (1856) 9 Md. 74. It applied to children of naturalized citizens as well as to children of natural-born citizens and citizens who were original actors in our Revolution. Crane v. Recder (1872) 25 Mich. 303. It did not apply to children of one not born till after the passage of such act. Town of Albany v. Town of Derby (1S58) 30 Vt. 718; State v. Jackson (1907) 65 Atl. 657. 79 Vt. 504, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1245. Nor to illegitimate children. Giiyer v. Smith (1864) 22 Md. 239. 85 Am. Dec. 650. Nor to children of those who left the country before the Declaration of Independence. Manchester v. Boston (1819) 16 Mass. 230. Nor to children whose parents, at the time of their birth, were aliens. Crane v. Reeder (1872) 25 Mich. 303.

A child whose father was a citizen of the United States after the treaty of peace with Great Britain, by which the independence of the United States was acknowledged, and after the adoption of the constitution of the United States, was not an alien though born without the United States. Charles v. Monson & Brimfield Mfg. Co. (1835) 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 70.

An individual whose father appears to have been a resident in this country, and to have married and had children born here, is presumed to be a citizen, although he himself was born subsequent to his father’s removal to a foreign country, there being nothing else to show his father to have beer an alien. Campbell v. Wallace (1841) 12 N. H. 362, 37 Am. Dec. 219.


Children of citizens of the United States, although born in foreign countries, and not within the act of congress of 1802, are nevertheless citizens of the United States. Lynch v. Clarke, (N. Y. 1844) 1 Sandf. Ch. 583.

Common law.—By the common law, a subject traveling abroad on public or private business, with the express or implied license of his sovereign, is under that sovereign’s protection, and, consequently, both he, and his children born while so traveling or so journeying, owe allegiance to, and are citizens of, the native country of their father. Ludlam v. Ludlam (N. Y. 1860) 31 Barb. 486.

Under St. 1778, abrogating all statutes of England in this state, and under the Laws of the United States, the citizenship of all children of Americans born abroad between 1802 and 1855 depends exclusively upon the dormant principles of the common law. Id.

The universal maxim of the common law being “partus sequitur patrem,” it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject, lawfully and without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother. Id.

In accordance with the above principles, it was held that the defendant, the son of an American citizen by an alien mother, born in a foreign country while his father was temporarily resident there, was a citizen of the United States, and entitled to inherit here. Id.

Held, also, that the greater or less duration of the father’s residence abroad was not material, so long as it was, in intention and in fact, temporary, and not perpetual. Id.

A citizen of the United States voluntarily, at the age of 18 years, went to Peru, with the intention of remaining there in trade an indefinite time, but was not naturalized there. Held, that by the common law^ in the absence of any law of the United States on the subject, his child born in Peru, of a wife a native of that country, was capable of inheriting property as a citizen of the United States. Ludlam v. Ludlam (1863) 26 N. Y. 356, 84 Am. Dec. 193.

Africans.—One who was born in Canada of parents of African blood born in Virginia, and held there as slaves until they emigrated to Canada, does not, by removing to the United States, become a citizen. Hedgiunn v. Board of Registration of Detroit (1872) 26 Mich. 51.

Double allegiance.—If by the laws of the country of their birth children of citizens born abroad are subjects of its government, it is not competent to the United States, by legislation, to interfere with that relation while they continue within the territory of that country, or to change the relation to other foreign nations which, by reason of their place of birth, may at any time exist. (1869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 90.

If he has voluntarily assumed the character of an Austrian citizen, however, and has resided in Austria five years (see article 1 of the convention of September 20, 1870, with the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy), it cannot be reasonably maintained by this government that his Austrian citizenship, or the political obligations appertaining thereto, may be cast aside by him at pleasure, so long as he continues to reside within the jurisdiction of that country. (1872) 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 154.


Treaty.—A person born in 1823, in the Oregon territory, whose father was a British subject, and whose mother was a member of the Chinook Indian tribe, is not a citizen of the United States. McKay v. Campbell (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 8,840.

§ 3950. (R. S. § 2312.) Citizenship of certain Stockbridge Munsee Indians.

Whenever any of the chiefs, warriors, or heads of families of the tribes mentioned in section twenty-three hundred and ten, having filed with the clerk of the district court of the United States a declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to dissolve all relations with any Indian tribe, two years previous thereto, appears in such court, and proves to the satisfaction thereof, by the testimony of two citizens, that for five years last past he has adopted the habits of civilized life; that he has maintained himself and family by his own industry; that he reads and speaks the English language; that he is well disposed to become a peaceable and orderly citizen; and that he has sufficient capacity to manage his own affairs; the court may enter a decree admitting him to all the rights of a citizen of the United States, and thenceforth he shall be no longer held or treated as a member of any Indian tribe, but shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges, and be subject to all the duties and liabilities to taxation of other citizens of the United States. But nothing herein contained shall be construed to deprive such chiefs, warriors, or heads of families of annuities to which they are or may be entitled.


Though an Indian has become a full fledged citizen of the United States, and resides on land patented to a prior grantor in fee simple absolute, yet so long as he remains within the limits of an Indian reservation he is subject to the constitutional control of the federal government. U. S. v. Gardner (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 690.

A native-born citizen of the United States who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and thus become a citizen or subject thereof, is to be regarded as an alien; and he cannot reacquire American nationality except In conformity to the laws of the United States providing for the admission of aliens to citizenship therein. Id.

While the government of the United States with jealous care will protect its humblest citizen wherever found, yet it is not our duty to aid a young man of 20 years to escape from military service in a government whose protection he has enjoyed since four years old, and where he has an acquired nationality which he does not propose to give up, and, when interrogated by the envoy of the American government, declines even to suggest that he ever intends to return to the United States and reclaim the nationality and assume the duties of an American citizen. Protection from a government involves the reciprocal duty of allegiance and service from the citizen when needed. (1875) 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 1



944. Peonage abolished.

3945. Foregoing section, how enforced.

§ 3925. (R. S. § 1977.) Equal rights under the law.

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right [in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property] as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

[Persons, as used here might well be only corporations.]

Act May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.

I. General scope of statute.—This and section 3931, post, partially enumerate the rights and immunities intended to be guaranteed by the constitution.

Straudcr v. West Virginia (1879) 100
U. S. 303, 311, 25 L. Ed. 664.

The object of this section and section 3931, post, was to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, on a level with whites, and [these sections] make the rights and responsibilities, civil and criminal, of the two races, exactly the same. Virginia v. Rives (1879) 100 U. S. 313′ 317, 318. 25 L. Ed. 667.

[Note the fact–that no sovereign, or natural rights are alluded to specifically only civil privileges. Lawfully, the principles involved are never quite exactly the same, especially in regards to protecting personal wealth, and this is the key point now blurred in present times. Unalienable and Inalienable Rights were not granted by that “institution of men” they were recognized as self-evident truths among equal men, and preserved by the compact between themselves.

The false assumption that governments give or grant Natural Rights, defies the logic behind the formation of the United States. When people try to assert their positive “Natural Rights” they are typically, smacked down by judges, who only consider civil rights under that qualification of jurisdiction. This begs the question of how are people supposed to assert a Right if they have no Jurisdiction of their own? This exclusion is of course not by accident, but by design and the remedy of this defect is going to require some very stout redress of grievances across the States.]

This section, so far as it confers rights, is not limited to negroes and colored persons. It confers rights on white persons, and puts in the form of statute what has been substantially ordained by the constitution. Kentucky v. Powers (C. C. 1905) 139 Fed. 452.

[Natural rights preceded the Constitution, but civil rights are only after the fact. This difference, makes any rights granted by U.S. citizenship rather inferior, and begs the question, why a statute was needed to enforce a Right already ordained. The constitution restricts the federal powers not the citizens ethical obligations to defend their own Rights. However, those Natural-Rights are never spoken of by policy intentions, and apparently routinely dismissed, as a condition to be even heard under that federal tax jurisdiction.]

2. Effect on state laws-Where the effect of a state statute limiting the right of foreign corporations [Persons]to sue in its courts is to deprive a corporation of another state [which ones?] of the equitable right to set off against a judgment rendered against it in such courts a judgment in its favor against the plaintiff therein, rendered in another state, such corporation [person] is deprived of its constitutional right to have full faith and credit given to such judgment, and also of the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings given it by this section. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (C. C. 1900) 10D Fed. 536.

Act Feb. 28, 1803, c. 10, prohibiting the importation of certain persons of color into certain states of the Union, is not repealed by the thirteenth amendment of the constitution, or by the civil rights act of April 9, 1866. (1808) 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 413.

The laws of Florida of November 22, 1829, and February 10. 1832, so far as they apply to colored British subjects, are not repugnant to the civil rights act Id.

3. Nature, purpose, and validity of civil rights bill of 1866.—This bill is not a penal statute, but a remedial one, and is to be liberally construed. U. S. v. Rhodes (C. C! 1866) Fed. Case. No. 16,151.

This act was within the power conferred upon congress by the thirteenth amendment, on the subject of slavery, under which it had full power to pass all laws deemed proper for its entire eradication in any form. U. S. v. Cruikshank (C. C. 1874) Fed. Case. No. 14,897. It was intended for the protection of citizens of the United States in enjoyment of certain rights without discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U. S. v.’ Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 555, 23 L. Ed. 588. While not intended to enlarge the privileges and immunities of white citizens, it furnished additional guaranties and remedies to secure their enjoyment. Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & SlaughterHouse Co. (C. C. 1870) Fed. Case. No. 8,408.

The civil rights act of April 9, 1866, was intended to protect against legal disabilities and legal impediments, and not private infringements of the rights secured, through prejudice or otherwise, when the laws are impartial and sufficient. Louisiana v. Dubuclet (C. C. 1877) Fed. Case. No. 8,538.

The first section of the civil rights bill of 1866, passed by congress under the thirteenth amendment and now covered in substance by this section, prescribes perfect equality of civil rights between the white and the colored races, and is a privilege given or secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Ex parte Riggins (C. C. 1904) 134 Fed. 404. order reversed Riggins v. U. S. (1905) 26 Sup. Ct. 147, 199 U. S. 547, 50 L. Ed. 303.

4. Validity.—The civil rights bill is constitutional. U. S. v. Rhodes (C. C. 1866) Fed. Case. No. 16.151: In re Turner (C. C. 1867) Fed. Case. No. 14,247; Kelley v. State (1869) 25 Ark. 392. It was enacted by virtue of Constitutional U. S. Amend. 13. Ex parte Virginia (1879) 100 U. S. 339, 344, 25 L. Ed. 676; U. S. v. Harris (1883) 1 Sup. Ct 601, 610, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. Ed. 290; U. S. v. Morris (D. C. 1903) 125 Fed. 322. But see Bowlin v. Commonwealth (1867) 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 92 Am. Dec. 468, holding that Civil Rights Bill, § 1, providing that citizens of every race and color in every state, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, shall have the same right in every state to sue, be parties, and “give evidence,” etc., was unconstitutional, as invading the right reserved to the states of regulating their own domestic concerns, and it could not be sustained as an act for the enforcement of the thirteenth amendment, prohibiting slavery.

5. Social intercourse.—These laws were intended to secure political and legal equality of rights to all citizens, but were not intended to establish social equality, or to enforce social intercourse between different classes of citizens. Charge to Grand Jury, The Civil Rights Act (C. C. 1875) Fed. Case. No. 18,258.

7. Rights of negroes in general.—

The first section of Civil Rights Bill April 9, 1866, now codified in substance in this section, but first passed in the exercise of power under the thirteenth amendment, prescribed as the standard of the freedom the amendment gave the emancipated race perfect equality of civil rights with the white race. The enjoyment of this civil equality with the white race constitutes, in its constitutional sense, the freedom intended to be bestowed, and is a right, privilege, or immunity given or secured by the constitution and laws of the United States to members of the emancipated race. Ex parte Riggins (O. C. 1904) 134 Fed. 404, reversed (1905) 26 Sup. Ct. 147, 199 U. S. 547, 50 L. Ed. 303.

The negro is invested with precisely the same rights that are possessed by the white race, and subject to the same duties, obligations, and liabilities. U. S. v. Buntin (C. C. 1882) 10 Fed. 730, 735.

14. Rights of laborers.—To deprive a man of the right to select and follow any lawful occupation—that is, to labor or contract to labor, if he so desires and can find employment—is to deprive him of both liberty and property within the meaning of this law. In re Parrott (C. C. 1880) 1 Fed. 481, 510.

Sections 1 and 2 of this act were held unconstitutional, at least so far as their operation in the several States was concerned, but without deciding whether the law was operative in the Territories and District of Columbia, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3.

Depriving citizens of their civil rights, under color of any law, etc., was made punishable by R. S. § 5510, which was incorporated in Criminal. Code, | 20, post, § 10184.

Notes of Decisions

Operation of statute.—The civil rights act of 1875 applies only to such rights as are granted by, and dependent on, the constitution and laws of the United States. U. S. v. Sanges (C. C. 1891) 48 Fed. 78, 87, writ of error dismissed (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 609, 144 U. S. 310, 36 L. Ed. 445.

Invalidity of statute.—Scope and purpose of the thirteenth amendment, considered as warranting this act. Ex parte Virginia (1879) 100 U. S. 339, 344, 25 L. Ed. 676.

The first and second sections of the civil rights act, passed March 1, 1875, in effect declaring that in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement [that] colored citizens, whether slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall have the same accommodations and privileges as are enjoyed by white citizens, and making it a penal offense in any person to deny to any citizen of any race or color, regardless of previous servitude, any of the said accommodations or privileges, are unconstitutional enactments as applied to the several states, not being authorized by either the thirteenth or fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

The provisions of the fourteenth amendment prohibiting state laws abridging the privileges of the [U.S.] citizen, or depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying any person equal protection of the law, apply exclusively to state legislation, and have no reference to illegal acts of individuals. The power granted congress to enforce it, with appropriate legislation, applies to corrective legislation only, such as may be necessary to counteract and redress the effect of such forbidden state laws, and will not authorize direct legislation, such as (__) March 1, 1875, known as the “Civil Rights Act.” U. S. v. Civil Rights Cases (1883) 3 Sup. Ct 18, 109 U. S. 3, 27 L. Ed. 835.

The invalidity, as applied to the states, of the provisions of this and the next section, (also) invalidates the law as applied to other places within the jurisdiction of the United States, such as an American vessel on the high seas [more than a marine league from land] and the District of Columbia and the territories. Butts v. Merchants’ & Miners’ Transp. Co. (1913) 33 Sup. Ct. 964, 230 U. S. 126, 57 L, Ed. 1422; U. S. v. Washington (C. C. 1883) 20 Fed. 630; Cully v.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. (D. C. 1876) Fed. Case. No. 3,466.



This section and the four sections next following constituted the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, c. 114, entitled’ “An act to protect all [U.S.] citizens in their civil and legal rights. The preamble of the act was: “Whereas, it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men before the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity.”

Jurisdiction.—The United States circuit court could not take jurisdiction of a trial for murder merely because a witness is a negro [U.S. citizen], and incompetent by the laws of the state to testify, under the provisions of the civil rights act of April 9, 1866, which gave jurisdiction to the circuit court of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce, in the courts of the state or locality where they may be, any of the rights given by the act, among which is the right to give evidence. A criminal prosecution is not to be considered as “affecting” mere witnesses in the case. Blyew v. U. S. (1871) 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 581, 20 L. Ed. 638.

The federal court has jurisdiction of a prosecution for burglary, where the owner of the building entered is, on account of color, incompetent by the law of the state to testify in support of the indictment as a white person might, though the indictment does not aver the statute denying the right. U. S. v. Rhodes (C. C. 1806) Fed. Case. No. 16,151.

Whether jurisdiction of a civil action for damages arising out of a violation of the equality guaranteed by the first section of the civil rights act of March 1, 1875, is conferred upon the United States courts by that act, quipre; but held that, if that act is constitutional jurisdiction is conferred by the act of March 3, 1875, as being a case “arising under the constitution or laws of the United States.” Smoot v. Kentucky Cent. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1882) 13 Fed. 337.

Where an action was brought to recover a penalty under the civil rights act of March 1, 1875. and the same is discontinued, upon the recent decision of the supreme court holding the act unconstitutional, held, that the defendant was entitled to costs under R. S. § 975, ante, § 1616. Held, also, that, independent of that section, costs could not be denied through any want of jurisdiction, since this court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the determination of the question of the validity of the act. Cooper v. New Havea Steamboat Co. (D. C. 1883) 18 Fed. 5S8.

Indictment.—An indictment (under this act) is insufficient which does not allege the citizenship of the person injured by the violation of such statute. U. S. v. Taylor (C. C. 1S80) 3 Fed. 563.


§ 3931. (R. S. § 1978.) Rights of citizens in respect to real and personal property.

All U. S. *citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Act April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.

[This citizen definition may also include corporations.]

§ 3932. (R. S. § 1979.) Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

Act April 20, l871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.

Before persons can be held to answer in the federal courts for conspiracy, they must be charged with conspiring to effect a purpose forbidden by some statute of the United States, or with doing some act in furthering the conspiracy, forbidden by a law of the United States; and where a petition claims damages for an alleged conspiracy to disbar plaintiff from practicing law in the state courts because he has filed a bill in a federal court charging defendants with misconduct and corruption in certain litigation pending in a state court, no cause of action is made out. Green v. Rogers (C. C. 1893) 56 Fed. 220.

The rights, privileges, and immunities which this section was designed to protect, are such as belonging to citizens of the United States as such, and not as citizens of a state. Wadleigh v. Newhall (C. C. 1905) 136 Fed. 941. *They do not include the right of an individual to life, liberty, or property, which were primary rights within the protection of the state. Brawner v. Irvin (C. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 964.

{*This is a very revealing admission and confirms the underlying reason why U.S. citizens can be swindled by political policies into perpetual, federal indebtedness. There are some deep, ugly truths here which cannot be ignored. A U.S. citizens property is always 100% at risk of confiscation. Any nonwhite citizen has another qualification— they only have those equal rights by privilege, therefore, their allegiance to the federal is based and enforced upon, by only having those same civil rights as white citizens. They forfeit one for the abuse of the other. To control the freed slaves by their citizenship, also meant ensnaring white citizens, but only those excluded from the higher rungs of the social ladder. This is political entrapment pure and simple.]

Persons of African descent have the same, but no greater rights, than other [U.S.] citizens in the state where they make their home; the rights and privileges protected from infringement by this section, and the infringement of which creates a cause of action for damages, being common to all citizens. Brawner v. Irvin (C. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 964.


2. Jurisdiction of federal courts.—The rights for the deprivation of which suits may be brought in a circuit court of the United States under R. S. § 629, cl. 16, ante, § 991 (14), for the protection of rights secured by the constitution of the United States, or for any law providing for equal rights of citizens, include civil rights only, and the provisions of that section were brought forward from Act April 20, 1871, to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co. (1900) 20 .Sup. Ct. 272, 273, 176 U. S. 68. 44 L. Ed. 374.

The scope of the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts was not extended beyond what was an appropriate subject-matter for equitable relief according to existing standards, by this section. Giles v. Harris (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 639, 189 U. S. 475, 47 L. Ed. 909.

The liability declared in this section for depriving a person of rights, privileges and immunities manifestly depends on the fact that such deprivation be under color of some statute, ordinance, etc., of a state or territory; and hence to constitute a cause of action under such section, plaintiff must show, as part of his case, that defendant claims to act under color of a statute, ordinance, etc., of a state or territory. California Oil & Gas Co. v. Miller (C. C. 1899 ) 96 Fed. 12, 22.

8. Corporations.—A corporation is included within the word “person.” Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde [‘ark (C. C. 1873) Fed. Case. No. 10,336.

The following section specifically outlines the subject of Peonage. Due to the debt of the federal being tied directly to the “creditor” on one end and the U.S. citizen on the other, which thereby, establishes a “condition of peonage” whereby the forced extraction of money from the debtor, is by force of legal coercion— the million dollar question becomes, at what point do those very same laws, regulations and codes become Null and Void? And if so, what are the immediate consequences? Ponder these questions carefully.

§ 3944. (R. S. § 1990.) Peonage abolished.

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of New Mexico, or of any other Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void. Act March 2, 1867, c. 187. § 1, 14 Stat. 540.

9. Proof.

10. Defense.

1. Operation of statute.—Though the system of peonage in New Mexico was the moving cause for the enactment of this and the following section, and its title and the senate debates showing that to be the fact, the act does more than merely abolish an existing system, and makes criminal certain acts which would tend to sustain or re-establish such a system; said section 5520 providing for the punishment of any person who holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be returned, any person “to a condition of peonage.In re [___] (C. C. 1902) 114 Fed. 903.

This section has no application to the state of Georgia, in which the system of peonage never existed. V. S. v. Eberhart (C. C. 1899) 127 Fed. 252.

Pen. Code Ga. 1910. S§ 715. 716, making it an offense for a person to obtain money on contract for services with intent not to perform, does not violate this section. Wilson v. State (1912) 75 S. B. 619, 138 Ga. 489.

2. Construction.—This statute is not construed with the same strictness or on the same footing as those that regulate or restrain the exercise of a natural right or forbid the doing of things not intrinsically wrong. Peonage Cases (D. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 671, 673.

3. Validity.—This section is a valid exercise of power granted to Congress by Const. U. S. Amend. 13. Clvntt v. U. S. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 429, 430. 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. Ed. 726; U. S. v. McClellan (D. C. 1904) 127 Fed. 971, 973, 979.

Cr. Code S. C. 1902, § 357, declaring a laborer under contract to labor on farm lands, who shall receive advances and thereafter willfully and without just cause fail to perform the reasonable service required by the contract, guilty of a misdemeanor, is in violation

of this section. Ex parte Hollman (1908) 60 S. E. 19, 79 S. C. 9.

4. “Peonage” defined.—Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service based on the indebtedness of the peon to the master. Clyatt v. U. S. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 429, 430, 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. Ed. 726.

Peonage is a term descriptive of a condition which has existed in Spanish America and especially in Mexico. The essence of the thing is compulsory service in payment of a debt. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt is paid. In this enactment congress was not concerned with mere names or manner of description or with a particular place or section of the country. It was concerned with the fact wherever it might exist; with a condition however named and wherever it might be established, maintained, or enforced. That a debtor contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the statute. It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that occurs the condition of servitude is created, which would be not less involuntary because of the original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach but not to enforce labor.

The act of Congress, nullifying all state laws by which it should be attempted to enforce the service or labor of any persons as peons in liquidation of any debt or obligation or otherwise, necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel the service or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform it. Such laws would furnish the readiest laws of compulsion. The thirteenth amendment of the constitution prohibits involuntary servitude except as a punishment for crime. But the exception in such amendment, allowing full latitude for the enforcement of penal laws, does not destroy the prohibition. It does not permit slavery or involuntary servitude to be established or maintained through the operation of the criminal law, by making it a crime to refuse to submit to the one or render the service which would constitute the other. The state may impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime, but it may not compel one man to labor for another for a debt by punishing him as a criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt.

What the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly. It cannot punish the servant as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve without paying his debt, and it is not permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory presumption, which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to conviction and punishment. Bailey v. Alabama (1911) 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 151, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191.


Peonage is a form of slavery, and was abolished and prohibited by this section. It may be defined as a condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The principal fact is the indebtedness. This indebtedness of the peon to the master is the criminal cord by which they are held bound to the master’s service. Upon this is based a condition of compulsory service. Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or involuntary, but this applies only to a difference in the origin, but none in the character of the servitude. The one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor to work out a debt. The other is forced upon the debtor by some apparent, but void, provision of law, or by the exercise of criminal force, that is sometimes the perfection of cruelty. But peonage, however created, is compulsory involuntary servitude. The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the debt; but otherwise the servitude is enforced. A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor in payment of debt. In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his debt in labor, can elect at any time to break it, and no law compels a continuance of the service. That which is contemplated to be prohibited by this section is compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt. In re Peonage Charge (C. C. 1905) 138 Fed. 686, 687.

The word “peonage,” as used in the statute, includes cases of involuntary servitude to work out a debt. But every case of such servitude may not be within the statute. A “peon” is defined as a “species of serf, compelled to work for his creditor until his debts are paid,” and the statute, in referring to the service or labor of persons as “peons in liquidation of any debt or obligation,” points to this definition. In re Lewis (C. C. 1902) 114 Fed. 963, 966, 967.

“Peonage,” within the meaning of this section and R. S. § 5526, post, §10442, is the holding of persons in unwilling servitude in payment of debts, by means either of force or intimidation. U. S. v. Clement (D. C. 1909) 171 Fed. 974.Peonage, within the meaning of this section, is the holding of any person to service or labor to pay a debt due from the laborer to the employer, when such employee desires to leave the employment before his debt is paid off; and it is immaterial whether the contract of employment was voluntarily made by the laborer or not, and whether it was made for a present or preexisting consideration. Peonage Cases (D. C. 1905) 136 Fed. 707, 708.

5. Condition of peonage.—The “condition of peonage,” to hold a person to which is made a crime, is a condition of forced servitude by which the servitor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in liquidation of some debt or obligation, either real or pretended, against his will; and any agreement giving another the right to exact such servitude is invalid under the law, and treated as though made involuntarily, and affords the creditor or master no protection. Peonage Cases (D. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 671, 679, 680.

If one person carries another before a magistrate, informing him that he is accused of crime, and the magistrate induces the accused, who is of weak mind, or little intelligence, or confiding, to believe that he has been sentenced to hard labor for a fine when in fact no offense was charged, no warrant issued, and no judgment entered, and such person is induced by such fraudulent means to submit to restraint of his liberty, the persons so concerned are guilty of causing the accused to be held to a condition of peonage. Id.

What influence, force, or threats to compel a person to render service to another in liquidation of an obligation amounts to coercion, such as, if effective, will render the service involuntary and create a condition of peonage, must be determined by taking into consideration in each case the relative inferiority of the person contracting to perform the service to the person exercising the force or influence to compel its performance. Id.

A person who hires another or induces him to sign a contract by which he agrees during the term to be imprisoned or kept under guard, and under cover of such agreement afterward holds the party to the performance of the contract by threats or punishment or undue influence, subduing his free will, when he desire’s to abandon the service, is guilty of holding such person to “a condition of peonage.” Id.

A condition of peonage, within the denunciation of this section, is the illegal holding of a person to involuntary servitude, to work out a debt or contract claimed to be due by the person so held to the person so holding.


6. Violation of statute—What constitutes.—The holding of another in a state of peonage, whether sanctioned or not by municipal or state law, is included in the prohibition in this section against peonage in any state or territory. Clyatt v. U. S. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 429, 431, 197 U. S. 207, 49 L. Ed. 726.

A person who falsely pretends to another that he is accused of crime, and offers his good offices to prevent his conviction if he will pay a sum of money, thereby to satisfy the prosecutor, and thus induces such party to sign a contract obligating himself to work to reimburse the amount paid out or pretended to be paid out for this purpose, and to submit to restraint and deprivation of his liberty while he is performing the contract, is guilty of holding such person, or causing him to be held, to a condition of peonage, whenever such person, having so entered on performance of the contract, desires to leave it, but is compelled to remain and perform it by threats or punishment, subduing his freedom of will; and any third person, for whose benefit such a contract is made, who, knowing such facts, becomes the custodian of the person so held to servitude and enforces performance of the contract, is also guilty of the offense. Peonage Cases (D. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 671, 682.

Inducing a person to labor in payment of debts by threats of prosecution may constitute intimidation and amount to peonage, if by reason of the different character of the parties such threats overcame the will of the servant and the service was involuntary. U. S. v. Clement (D. C. 1909) 171 Fed. 974, 976.

The fact that persons were induced to work for another in payment of debts through fear of prosecution if they refused did not render the master guilty of peonage, unless such fear was caused by threats of prosecution made by him at the time. Id.

To constitute the crime of holding another person in peonage, defendant need not have acted corruptly. Id.

7. State laws.—So far as the refusal without just cause to perform the labor called for in a written contract under which the employee obtained money not refunded or property not paid for was made prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud by Code Ala. 1896, § 4730, as amended by Gen. Acts 1903, p. 345, and Gen. Acts 1907, p. 636, and therefore punishable as a criminal offense, such statute offends against this section, especially since, under the local practice accused may not, to rebut the statutory presumption, testify to his uncommunicated motives, purposes, or intentions. Bailey v. Alabama (1911) 31 Sup. Ct. 145, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191, reversing judgment (1909) 49 South. 886, 161 Ala. 75.

A condition of peonage results from Code Ala. § 6846, under which a person fined for a misdemeanor may confess judgment with a surety in the amount of the fine and agreeing with the surety on payment of the judgment to reimburse him by working for him on terms approved by the court. U. S. v. Reynolds (1914) 35 Sup. Ct 86, 235 U. S. 133, 59 L. Ed. 162, reversing judgments (D. C. 1914) 213 Fed. 352, and Same v. Broughton (D. C. 1914) 213 Fed. 345.

Act Ala. March 1, 1901 (Acts 190001, p. 1208, § 1), making it a penal offense to abandon a contract for services, violates this section. In re Peonage Charge (C. C. 1905) 138 Fed. 686.

8. Federal Jurisdiction.—A federal court may entertain a prosecution for violation of this section, though prosecution of the same acts under the name of kidnapping and false imprisonment might be held in the state courts. U. S. v. McClellan (D. C. 1903) 127 Fed. 971.

9. Proof.—Evidence of a prior condition of peonage to which the persons so held were returned by the acts of the defendant, is essential to support a conviction under an indictment charging him with returning certain designated persons to a condition of peonage. Clyatt v. U. S. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct, 429, 432, 197 U. S. 207. 49 L. F.H. 720.

10. Defense.—A magistrate or other judicial officer, who corruptly exercises his functions in order that a citizen may be unlawfully convicted of crime and sold into involuntary servitude for the benefit of another, with whom he has an understanding, cannot escape liability for the conspiracy, and its natural and designed results in holding the accused to a condition of peonage, because of the official character of his acts. Peonage Cases (D. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 671, 083, 684

section 5. definitions–B. The term “United States” means the United States and any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and the term “continental United States” means the States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Alaska: Provided, however, That for the purposes of this Order the term “United States” shall not be deemed to include any territory included within the term “foreign country” as defined in paragraph D of this section.—U.S. CodeTitle 50Chapter 53 › § 4305

Whenever the term”United States” is used it is not a good idea to assume anything unless the defined term means what it specifically implies.


Now who exactly is the Master?

Speaker-Rep. James Traficant, Jr. (Ohio) addressing the House:

It is an established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933,
48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719; declared by President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. [House Joint Resolution]
192, 73rd Congress in session June 5, 1933 -Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold Clause
dissolved the Sovereign Authority of the United States and the official capacities of all United States Governmental Offices,
Officers, and Departments and is further evidence that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only. The receivers of the United States Bankruptcy are the International Bankers, via the United Nations, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. All United States Offices, Officials, and Departments are now operating within a de facto status in name only under Emergency War Powers. With the Constitutional Republican form of Government now dissolved, the receivers of the Bankruptcy have adopted a new form of government for the United States.

“In 1933, the federal United States hypothecated all of the present and future properties, assets and labor of their “subjects,” the 14th Amendment U.S. citizen, to the Federal Reserve System.
The Federal Reserve System is based on the Canon law and the principles of sovereignty protected in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In fact, the international bankers used a “Canon Law Trust” as their model, adding stock and naming it a “Joint Stock Trust.” The U.S. Congress had passed a law making it illegal for any legal “person” to duplicate a “Joint Stock Trust” in 1873. The Federal Reserve Act was legislated post-facto (to 1870) [to make the Federal Reserve Bank exempt from the “Joint Stock Trust” law of 1873], although post-facto laws are strictly forbidden by the Constitution. [1:9:3]

The Federal Reserve System is a sovereign power structure separate and distinct from the federal United States government. The Federal Reserve is a maritime lender, and/or maritime insurance underwriter to the federal United States operating exclusively under Admiralty/Maritime law. The lender or underwriter bears the risks, and the Maritime law compelling specific performance in paying the interest, or premiums are the same.

Assets of the debtor can also be hypothecated (to pledge something as a security without taking possession of it.) as security by the lender or underwriter. The Federal Reserve Act stipulated that the interest on the debt was to be paid in gold. There was no stipulation in the Federal Reserve Act for ever paying the principle.

[Prior to 1913, most Americans owned clear, allodial title to property, free and clear of any liens or mortgages until the Federal Reserve Act (1913)]

“Hypothecated” all property within the federal United States to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, -in which the Trustees (stockholders) held legal title. The U.S. citizen (tenant, franchisee) was registered as a “beneficiary” of the trust via his/her birth certificate. In 1933, the federal United States hypothecated all of the present and future properties, assets and labor of their “subjects,” the 14th Amendment U.S. citizen, to the Federal Reserve System.

In return, the Federal Reserve System agreed to extend the federal United States corporation all the credit “money substitute” it needed. Like any other debtor, the federal United States government had to assign collateral and security to their creditors as a condition of the loan. Since the federal United States didn’t have any assets, they assigned the private property of their “economic slaves”, the U.S. citizens as collateral against the unpayable federal debt. They also pledged the unincorporated federal territories, national parks forests, birth certificates, and nonprofit organizations, as collateral against the federal debt. All has already been transferred as payment to the international bankers.”— United States Congressional Record, March 17, 1993 Vol. 33, page H-1303—James Traficant’s Speech


—“My history lessons in high school and college briefly covered the Great Depression and the New Deal proposals. Nowhere in any of those classes or in the text books did I find any discussion about The Emergency Act of 1933, or the implications of that Act.
Executive Orders 6073, 6102, 6111 & Executive Order 6260 and the Trading with the Enemy Act started the process of changing the United States from a sovereign nation to a bankrupt entity under the control of the international bankers as original creditors.
At first glance, this might seem preposterous; however, excerpts from the Congressional Record bear out the condition of bankruptcy, at least for the United States.
“That is the equity of what we are about to do. Yes; you are going to close us down. Yes; you have already closed us down, and have been doing it long before this year. Our President says that for 3 years we have been on the way to bankruptcy. We have been on the way to bankruptcy longer than 3 years. We have been on the way to bankruptcy ever since we began to allow the financial mastery of this country gradually to get into the hands of a little clique that has held it right up until they would send us to the grave.” — Congressional Record, Congressman Long, March 11, 1933
It appears that Congressman Long is referring to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 that gave complete and unregulated control of our money system to a cabal of private bankers.
“I want to show you where the people are being imposed upon by reason of the delegation of this tremendous power. I invite your attention to the fact that section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that whenever the Government of the United States issues and delivers money, Federal Reserve notes, which are based on the credit of the Nation–they represent a mortgage upon your home and my home, and upon all the property of all the people of the Nation–to the Federal Reserve agent, an interest charge shall be collected from the Government.” — Congressional Record, Congressman Patman, March 13, 1933

The confabulated path so required to understand the magnitude of the problem, is also why so many just say, ‘screw it all’ and go about their daily lives no doubt hoping, somebody else will figure it all out. The legalized, yet odious obligations which bind the American people to the chains of everlasting debt, have also perfected that invisible cage around the U.S. citizen, which is without question the modern day version of indebtedness by peonage.

That’s the funny thing— nobody considered themselves a peon by natural choice, hell, some may be quite offended by even implying such a wretched state, and yet, it is the one action [so abolished] that would set all State Citizens free from that fake mountain of perpetual, debt obligations. Where did that Consideration of Value go when the fiat dollar became the only game in town?


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