What is Left—- When “Rights” Are Gone

What is the common thread linking all of the IRS scandals, TSA goons, DHS goons with Agenda 21 and just about every other wretched action of the FEDS over the last century?  That would be the war on Rights. Why was Cannabis outlawed under a slang term originating with the illiterate peasants of Mexico? Corporations brought suit to stop farmers from enjoying their natural inalienable Rights and justified this unconstitutional action by lying, falsifying and fraudulently conniving through their yellow-press machine that hemp was “marijuana” and posed a serious threat to Americans.

Hemp is a plant of a thousand productive uses and a fundamental addition to any farmers highest quality food-stocks, that would be the seeds which do not contain any THC period. As if THC was a drug— which it is not— no natural substance from Nature is a drug— but the goons of the FDA, or the goons of the FDEA, knowing the goons of the Justice dept. will never allow positive evidence to enter a Federal Court, under any circumstances and even when it is generated from government research, have nothing to fear when the lie is too big to fail.

Congress, with un-limited resources from the caustically, un-constitutional Federal Reserve Board Bank, playing monopoly money with the defunct Treasury,  lords over Resolutions, like madmen drunk on power, while the Executive Officer so enshrined and enthroned by the War Powers Act, going right back to Lincoln and the civil war, put on steroids by the Trading with the Enemy Acts, whose kingly powers are expressed by the executive orders, runs a quasi-Corporational, mutant-hybrid government not unlike what Monsanto has done with corn or soybeans— poisonous to Natural Rights— deadly to the real people of the nation and very expensive to boot.

So expensive in fact, that compounding debt is violating the Natural property rights of all citizens, right this very second,  merely by math alone…. much like a crazed pit-bull taking out a tiny Chihuahua. That scene is the future of any one under thirty— give or take a few decades—- when the unpayable debt hits the fan.  Exponential debt interest is so dangerous to the well-being of a Nations people,  it makes a nuclear bomb, seem downright benign by comparison. Usury is a weapon of mass economic destruction and usurpation of Rights, both inalienable and unalienable, which is where the federal Sword eventually meets your neck.

The public masses are blithely waiting for the “New world Order” to come spinning around the corner like a crazed, Tasmanian Devil out to destroy their treasured way of life, while another segment looks out for the Anti-Christ to rear its seven heads and speak wonders and perform miracles even as it mocks the Principles of Jesus. The black Pope over-sees an army of Jesuit back-stabbers out to eradicate Protestants, so named, who protested the claims of the white Popes Divine Ruler-ship, over the whole of the Earth, whose every word was deemed infallible and therefore, beyond question from any lessor mortal. Thereby depriving every living man of their unalienable rights to judge the religious sentiments according to their own conscience. Which is why the early settlers of the colonies so named, were more than just a bit paranoid about allowing  Catholics to enter into the ranks of government, where their loyalties would be in stark contradiction to the establishment of freedom of religion, the pursuit of liberty, and the happiness which only comes from having unalienable Rights, not those so deemed inalienable. [And for the record the new world order has been here for quite some time now….]

Which begs the question: what is the fundamental difference between these rights and why is this arcane and obscure conflict of meanings the actual battle ground the American citizen is fighting upon, as if they were merely peon U. S.  citizens, as in all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,….  and nothing more?

“… at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects, and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty … Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or State sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides.

In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the Prince; here, it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the government; here, never in a single instance; our Governors are the agents of the people, and, at most, stand in the same relation to their sovereign in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their Princes have personal powers, dignities, and preeminences; our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.” –Supreme Court of the United States— 2 US 419 (February 1794) Chisholm v. Georgia Chief Justice: Jay, John Argued: February 5, 1793 Decided: February 18, 1793

The arguments involved here go all the back to the days of the ‘Founding’ itself and the entry in the Wikipedia, is as good as any to bring these two rights into proper focus:

“The concept of inalienable rights was criticized by Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke as groundless. Bentham and Burke, writing in 18th century Britain, claimed that rights arise from the actions of government, or evolve from tradition, and that neither of these can provide anything inalienable. (See Bentham’s “Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights”, and Burke’s “Reflections on the Revolution in France“). Presaging the shift in thinking in the 19th century, Bentham famously dismissed the idea of natural rights as “nonsense on stilts”. By way of contrast to the views of British nationals Burke and Bentham, the leading American revolutionary scholar James Wilson condemned Burke’s view as “tyranny.”[20]

[James Wilson was correct in that judgment as the critics were subjects of the King and the Pope and no doubt did not dare say otherwise any principle which diminished the royal authorities Rights.]

The signers of the Declaration of Independence deemed it a “self-evident truth” that all men are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” In “The Social Contract,” *Jean-Jacques Rousseau claims that the existence of inalienable rights is unnecessary for the existence of a constitution or a set of laws and rights. This idea of a social contract – that rights and responsibilities are derived from a consensual contract between the government and the people – is the most widely recognized alternative.

[*That may be true, however, history proves time and time again, when Rights are not manifest outside of social compacts they are soon trampled as if their existence was not necessary for the governments good.]

Samuel P. Huntington, an American political scientist, wrote that the *”inalienable rights” argument from the Declaration of Independence was necessary because “The British were white, Anglo, and Protestant, just as we were. [Advocates for the Declaration’s adoption] had to have some other basis on which to justify independence”.

[*Note he switched terms–unalienable means something quite different than inalienable.]

For instance, Jonathan Wallace has asserted that there is no basis on which to claim that some rights are natural, and he argued that Hobbes’ account of natural rights confuses right with ability (human beings have the ability to seek only their own good and follow their nature in the same way as animals, but this does not imply that they have a right to do so).[21] Wallace advocates a social contract, much like Hobbes and Locke, but does not base it on natural rights:

“We are all at a table together, deciding which rules to adopt, free from any vague constraints, half-remembered myths, anonymous patriarchal texts and murky concepts of nature. If I propose something you do not like, tell me why it is not practical, or harms somebody, or is counter to some other useful rule; but don’t tell me it offends the universe.”

Other critics have argued that the attempt to derive rights from “natural law” or “human nature” is an example of the is-ought problem. However, the term “natural” in “natural rights” refers to the opposite of “artificial”, rather than meaning “physical” as it does in the sense of ethical naturalism, which according to G.E. Moore does suffer the is-ought problem in the form of the naturalistic fallacy.

[The problem here is defining what is actually “natural law” as consistent with immutable laws of physics. Men by their nature are not simply animals, therefore, what compelled mankind to rise above the natural station of the rest of the animal kingdom was not natural. As created beings mankind belonged to that which created him, as property. When the owners in question left mankind to fend for himself, man sought to retain his civilized nature, but those efforts were often in grave conflict with a more cynical animus of predatory cultures which held that might is right and those conquered had no rights save for those granted to them as slaves. The deeper question of ancient beings ruling over the earth as gods of human beings will be another subject of inquiry, but for now I will stick to the earth-corporeal side of the question only. Having shed blood for the “Rights” these fought for Rights became natural, as a result of the endeavors of success, not by the failure to achieve.]

Hugh Gibbons has proposed a descriptive argument based on human biology. He claims that Human Beings were other-[?] regarding as a matter of necessity, in order to avoid the costs of conflict. Over time they developed expectations that individuals would act in certain ways which were then prescribed by society (duties of care etc.) and that eventually crystallized into actionable rights.[22]

There is also debate as to whether all rights are either natural or legal. Fourth president of the United States James Madison, while representing Virginia in the House of Representatives, believed that there are rights, such as trial by jury, that are social rights, arising neither from natural law nor from positive law (which are the basis of natural and legal rights respectively) but from the social contract from which a government derives its authority.[23]

17th-century English philosopher John Locke discussed natural rights in his work, identifying them as being “life, liberty, and estate (property)”, and argued that such fundamental rights could not be surrendered in the social contract.

Preservation of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property was claimed as justification for the rebellion of the American colonies. As George Mason stated in his draft for the Virginia Declaration of Rights, “all men are born equally free,” and hold “certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity.”[30]

[Unless, they had become slaves like the English under William, or the races of the black man in general, as they were not of one single group being sold off to the slave traders.]

Another 17th-century Englishman, John Lilburne (known as Freeborn John), who came into conflict with both the monarchy of King Charles I and the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell governed republic, argued for level human basic rights he called “freeborn rights” which he defined as being rights that every human being is born with, as opposed to rights bestowed by government or by human law.

The distinction between alienable and unalienable rights was introduced by Francis Hutcheson. In his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), Hutcheson foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence, stating: “For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable Rights, there must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance. . . . Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments.”

Hutcheson, however, placed clear limits on his notion of unalienable rights, declaring that “there can be no Right, or Limitation of Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good.”[31]

Hutcheson elaborated on this idea of unalienable rights in his ‘A System of Moral Philosophy’ (1755), based on the Reformation principle of the liberty of conscience. One could not in fact give up the capacity for private judgment (e.g., about religious questions) regardless of any external contracts or oaths to religious or secular authorities so that right is “unalienable.”

Hutcheson wrote: “Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable.”[32]

In the German EnlightenmentHegel gave a highly developed treatment of this inalienability argument. Like Hutcheson, Hegel based the theory of inalienable rights on the de facto inalienability of those aspects of person-hood that distinguish persons from things. A thing, like a piece of property, can in fact be transferred from one person to another.

According to Hegel, the same would not apply to those aspects that make one a person:

“The right to what is in essence inalienable is imprescriptible, since the act whereby I take possession of my personality, of my substantive essence, and make myself a responsible being, capable of possessing rights and with a moral and religious life, takes away from these characteristics of mine just that externality which alone made them capable of passing into the possession of someone else. When I have thus annulled their externality, I cannot lose them through lapse of time or from any other reason drawn from my prior consent or willingness to alienate them.”[33]

In discussion of social contract theory, “inalienable rights” were said to be those rights that could not be surrendered by citizens to the sovereign. Such rights were thought to be natural rights, independent of positive law. Some social contract theorists reasoned, however, that in the natural state only the strongest could benefit from their rights. Thus, people form an implicit social contract, ceding their natural rights to the authority to protect the people from abuse, and living henceforth under the legal rights of that authority.

Many historical apologies for slavery and illiberal government were based on explicit or implicit voluntary contracts to alienate any “natural rights” to freedom and self-determination.[34] The de facto inalienability arguments of the Hutcheson and his predecessors provided the basis for the anti-slavery movement to argue not simply against involuntary slavery but against any explicit or implied contractual forms of slavery. Any contract that tried to legally alienate such a right would be inherently invalid. Similarly, the argument was used by the democratic movement to argue against any explicit or implied social contracts of subjection (pactum subjectionis) by which a people would supposedly alienate their right of self-government to a sovereign as, for example, in Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. According to Ernst Cassirer,

“There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to personality…    They charged the great logician [Hobbes] with a contradiction in terms. If a man could give up his personality he would cease being a moral being. … There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of submission by which man can give up the state of free agent and enslave himself. For by such an act of renunciation he would give up that very character which constitutes his nature and essence: he would lose his humanity.”[35]

These themes converged in the debate about American Independence. While Jefferson was writing the Declaration of Independence, Richard Price in England sided with the Americans’ claim “that Great Britain is attempting to rob them of that liberty to which every member of society and all civil communities have a natural and unalienable title.”[36] Price again based the argument on the de facto inalienability of “that principle of spontaneity or self-determination which constitutes us agents or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly ours, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cause.[37]

Any social contract or compact allegedly alienating these rights would be non-binding and void, wrote Price:

“Neither can any state acquire such an authority over other states in virtue of any compacts or cessions. This is a case in which compacts are not binding. Civil liberty is, in this respect, on the same footing with religious liberty. As no people can lawfully surrender their religious liberty by giving up their right of judging for themselves in religion, or by allowing any human beings to prescribe to them what faith they shall embrace, or what mode of worship they shall practise, so neither can any civil societies lawfully surrender their civil liberty by giving up to any extraneous jurisdiction their power of legislating for themselves and disposing their property.[38]

Price raised a furor of opposition so in 1777 he wrote another tract that clarified his position and again restated the de facto basis for the argument that the “liberty of men as agents is that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess.”[39] In Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism,  Staughton Lynd pulled together these themes and related them to the slavery debate:

“Then it turned out to make considerable difference whether one said slavery was wrong because every man has a natural right to the possession of his own body, or because every man has a natural right freely to determine his own destiny. The first kind of right was alienable: thus Locke neatly derived slavery from capture in war, whereby a man forfeited his labor to the conqueror who might lawfully have killed him; and thus Dred Scott was judged permanently to have given up his freedom.  But the second kind of right, what Price called “that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess,” was inalienable as long man remained man. Like the mind’s quest for religious truth from which it was derived, self-determination was not a claim to ownership which might be both acquired and surrendered, but an inextricable aspect of the activity of being human.[40]

Meanwhile in America, Thomas Jefferson “took his division of rights into alienable and unalienable from Hutcheson, who made the distinction popular and important”,[41] and in the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence, famously condensed this to:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights..”.

In the 19th century, the movement to abolish slavery seized this passage as a statement of constitutional principle, although the U.S. constitution recognized and protected slavery. As a lawyer, future Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase argued before the Supreme Court in the case of John Van Zandt, who had been charged with violating the Fugitive Slave Act, that:

    “The law of the Creator, which invests every human being with an *inalienable title to freedom, cannot be repealed by any interior law which asserts that man is property.”
[*Note the switch again, as Chase defends the British version of the principle. The Fugitive slave act was un-constitutional because slavery, violated the principles enshrined in the compact itself. The absurdity arose due to slavery being a violation of the constitution to itself. Hence the secondary defect of hypocrisy. Mankind included the black race period, and to say otherwise, is a gross fallacy. The constitution cannot contain a lie and remain true to its principles. If the men of that time did not want black men in their culture all they had to do was stop importing them as slaves. Blacks who came to America as free men were no different, or worse, than any other race of mankind who came here for the same reasons or endeavors.]
A quick look at an interesting snippet of his later years:
     “Thanks to his presidential ambitions, Chase would often threaten to resign from the Treasury post in order to make a run for the office. Lincoln declined to accept three of Chase’s resignations, but the fourth try was the charm for Chase in 1864. Shortly after Chase’s resignation, though, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney died. Lincoln nominated Chase for the opening, and on December 6, 1864, Chase became the sixth Chief Justice of the United States.
Chase wasn’t a natural fit for the position, as evidenced by his aforementioned continued political campaigning. Although he made some progressive moves from the bench—he appointed John Rock as the first African-American to argue a case before the court—he didn’t love the work. Chase held the position until his death in 1873, but he summed up his time on the bench thusly: “Working from morning till midnight and no result, except that John Smith owned this parcel or land or other property instead of Jacob Robinson; I caring nothing and nobody caring much more, about the matter.” http://mentalfloss.com/article/24750/5-things-you-didnt-know-about-salmon-chase —.]

Back to the Wikipedia entry:

“Many documents now echo the phrase used in the United States Declaration of Independence. The preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that rights are *inalienable: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and *inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”

Article 1, §1 of the California Constitution recognizes *inalienable rights, and articulated some (not all) of those rights as “defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” However, there is still much dispute over which “rights” are truly natural rights and which are not, and the concept of natural or *inalienable rights is still controversial to some.

[*All using inalienable not unalienable and  no doubt confusing the distinctions. That which can never be sold versus that which can by consent. Can a man sell his personality from himself? Can the government seize your personality and sell it elsewhere? If your property is stated to have the same quality of unalienable rights then no rights of property can be sold.  A man sells the use of the property of his labors not the property of himself. This is why labor property cannot be taxed without violating the underlying principle of ownership, or the unalienable Right to pursue vocations without hindrance or distraint. Keep this in mind for now. ]

Erich Fromm argued that some powers over human beings could be wielded only by God, and that if there were no God, no human beings could wield these powers.[42]

[I suggest mankind does not know those powers period.]

Contemporary political philosophies continuing the liberal tradition of natural rights include libertarianism, anarcho-capitalism and Objectivism, and include amongst their canon the works of authors such as Robert Nozick, Ludwig von Mises, Ayn Rand,[43] and Murray Rothbard. [44]

A libertarian view of inalienable rights is laid out in Morris and Linda Tannehill’s ‘The Market for Liberty’, which claims that a man has a right to ownership over his life and therefore also his property, because he has invested time (i.e. part of his life) in it and thereby made it an extension of his life.

However, if he initiates force against and to the detriment of another man, he alienates himself from the right to that part of his life which is required to pay his debt: “Rights are not inalienable, but only the possessor of a right can alienate himself from that right – no one else can take a man’s rights from him.”[45]

Here again a solid argument takes an odd turn— If the Right is unalienable, no one but the individual can posses it unique to himself. Another reason why it cannot be sold. People do not have artificial minds, or wills and cannot be dis-possessed of either, except in death. Therefore, if they cannot be taken they cannot be given by the same inferior proposition. Rights do not exist apart from the minds which know them to be real and thus can be true. As rights do not exist in nature apart from mankind, man does not need to explain them as any thing less than a function of his will and conscience.

The real question is actually how man uses his Rights in accordance with his own will and his conscience. This is where the battle is focused. When a man does harm to another he loses the Right of his own determination, as a natural expression of consequence. Consequences are often quite immutable and serve as a grim reminder of the limitations of human folly. When men do harm to others for profit, gain, emotional satisfaction or just pure animosity, by that action of choice  they have repudiated the principle which also protects themselves. It is because they no longer have such a “protection” that they are in consequence of its loss.

Another researcher put together quite a list of court cases which demonstrate the substantial importance that these two terms ‘inalienable and unalienable’ have served in our society by lawful applications at large, even as they are mis-understood, and often used in conflict of the intending meanings. The goons in D.C. are in a tar-pit of madness. That would be of their own making. The biggest lie of all is—- that this was the only way possible— and yet nothing stops them from changing the rules when it suits them to do so, thereby proving, the rules are political, not based on principle and they have no Rights to be evil.


“Things which are not in commerce, as public roads, are in their nature unalienable. Some things are unalienable, in consequence of particular provisions in the law forbidding their sale or transfer, as pensions granted by the government. The natural rights of life and liberty are UNALIENABLE. Bouviers Law Dictionary 1856 Edition”

“Unalienable: incapable of being alienated, that is, sold and transferred.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 1523:   You can not surrender, sell or transfer unalienable rights, they are a gift from the Creator to the individual and can not under any circumstances be surrendered or taken. All individual’s have unalienable rights.”

Inalienable rights: Rights which are not capable of being surrendered or transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights.  Morrison v. State, Mo. App., 252 S.W.2d 97, 101.”

By logical extension all American citizens have both, but thanks to the dismal quality of the educational system, most people might not even care why these facts are so important. Without such rights the law itself is frivolous. Without a man to give force and shape to a Law it ceases to exist. Immutable laws need not man or his mind or they would cease to be immutable the moment man changed his mind. A State is a fiction only made real by those who call upon it as an extension of their own selves. Men are not bound to States, as fictions have no authority over the Living Souls of man. If the federal government had its own life what kind of creature would it be? A two-headed Shark-Rex comes to mind… good thing it’s a fiction of contrivance. Only as good as it does no harm!  To do no Harm is the maximum of true Law.

“Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted. That property which a man has honestly acquired he retains full control of, subject to these limitations: First, that he shall not use it to his neighbor’s injury, and that does not mean that he must use it for his neighbor’s benefit; second, that if the devotes it to a public use, he gives to the public a right to control that use; and third, that whenever the public needs require, the public may take it upon payment of due compensation.” BUDD v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK, 143 U.S. 517 (1892)

“Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great document, is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment. The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions.

The right to pursue them, without let or hinderance, except that which is applied to all persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright.


The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him. . . The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an *inalienable right, it was formulated as such under the phrase ‘pursuit of happiness’ in the declaration of independence, which commenced with the fundamental proposition that ‘all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’

This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen. To deny it to all but a few favored individuals, by investing the latter with a monopoly, is to invade one of the fundamental privileges of the citizen, contrary not only to common right, but, as I think, to the express words of the constitution. It is what no legislature has a right to do; and no contract to that end can be binding on subsequent legislatures. . . BUTCHERS’ UNION CO. v. CRESCENT CITY CO., 111 U.S. 746 (1884)”

Turning once again to Wikipedia, for a review of the case itself:

The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) were the first United States Supreme Court interpretation of the relatively new Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. It is viewed as a pivotal case in early civil rights law, reading the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting the “privileges or immunities” conferred by virtue of the federal United States citizenship to all individuals of all states within it, but not those privileges or immunities incident to citizenship of a state.

[That would be the distinction between inalienable and alienable— the defect of slavery confused the law and deprived foreign men of their unalienable Rights—and brought about an unintended consequence— alienable Rights of one form of citizenship, are now in conflict with another quite Superior and yet the Federal distinction is now held to be the superior—  a blatant fallacy has begun yet another defect in law.]

History and legal dispute:

As one resident put it,  New Orleans in the mid-19th century was plagued by “intestines and portions of putrefied animal matter lodged [around the drinking pipes] coming from local slaughterhouses whenever the tide from the Mississippi river was low.” [1]  A mile and a half upstream from the city, a thousand butchers gutted over 300,000 animals per year. [2] Animal entrails (known as offal), dung, blood, and urine were a part of New Orleans’ drinking water, which was implicated in cholera outbreaks among the population. Between 1832 and 1869, the city of New Orleans suffered eleven cholera outbreaks. [3] In response, a New Orleans grand jury recommended that the slaughterhouses be moved south, but since many of the slaughterhouses were outside city limits, the grand jury’s recommendations carried no weight.

The city then appealed to the state legislature. As a result, in 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed “An Act to Protect the Health of the City of New Orleans, to Locate the Stock Landings and Slaughter Houses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-House Company,” a law that allowed the city of New Orleans to create a corporation that centralized all slaughterhouse operations in the city. [4] At the time, New York, San Francisco, Boston, Milwaukee, and Philadelphia all had similar provisions to confine butchers to areas that kept offal from contaminating the water supply.

[5] The legislature chartered a private corporation, the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company to run a “Grand Slaughterhouse” [6] at the southern part of the city opposite of the Mississippi. Crescent City was not to slaughter beef itself, but to act as a franchise corporation, renting out space to other butchers in the city for a fee under a designated maximum.

In addition, the statute granted “sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the livestock landing and slaughterhouse business within the limits and privilege granted by the act, and that all such animals shall be landed at the stock landings and slaughtered at the slaughterhouses of the company, and nowhere else. Penalties are enacted for infractions of this provision, and prices fixed for the maximum charges of the company for each steamboat and for each animal landed.” [7] This exclusivity would last for a twenty-five year period. All other slaughterhouses would be closed up, forcing butchers to slaughter within the operation set up by Crescent City.

The statute forbade Crescent City from favoring one butcher over another by promising harsh penalties for refusal to sell space to any butcher. All animals on the premises would be inspected by an officer appointed by the governor of the state.

Over four hundred members of the Butchers’ Benevolent Association joined together to sue to stop Crescent City’s takeover of the slaughterhouse industry.[8] In the background of his majority opinion, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Freeman Miller reiterated the concerns of the butchers:

“This statute is denounced [by the butchers] not only as creating a monopoly and conferring odious and exclusive privileges upon a small number of persons at the expense of the great body of the community of New Orleans, but it is asserted that it deprives a large and meritorious class of citizens—the whole of the butchers of the city—of the right to exercise their trade, the business to which they have been trained and on which they depend for the support of themselves and their families, and that the unrestricted exercise of the business of butchering is necessary to the daily subsistence of the population of the city.”

“The lower courts found in favor of Crescent City in all cases. Six cases were appealed to the Supreme Court. The butchers based their claims on the due process, privileges or immunities and equal protection clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified by the states only five years before the decision in 1868. Their attorney, former Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell (who had retired due to his Confederate loyalties), was then involved in a number of cases in New Orleans designed to obstruct Radical Reconstruction.  Although the 14th Amendment was passed to protect newly freed slaves in the South, the language of Section 1 is not racially limited. Campbell was therefore able to argue for a new, broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that would allow butchers of any race to “sustain their lives through labor.”

[But the sad fact is those men did not need the 14th, they already had substantial protection— the real problem was they failed to stop harming other people by the consequences of their business actions. Were they really that ignorant of the foul wastes due only to their operations? Had they tried to solve the environmental problems before the suit was raised the entire ordeal never arises at all. They were wrong, but the solution went well beyond the cleaning up or relocation as needed.]

Resolution by the Court:

In a 5-4 decision issued on April 14, 1873, by Justice Samuel Freeman Miller, the Court held to a narrow interpretation of the amendment and ruled that it did not restrict the police powers of the state. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause affected only rights of United States citizenship and not state citizenship.

[This also calls into question that the duplicity of language was short-sighted and not well thought out in consequence. The 14th is actually so exclusive it cannot be claimed to be a class of citizenship for any state citizens who are not slaves.]

Therefore the butchers’ Fourteenth Amendment rights had not been violated. At the time, the Court viewed due process in a procedural light rather than substantively. The Court further held that the amendment was primarily intended to protect former slaves and so could not be broadly applied.

“We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us. No questions so far reaching and pervading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their bearing upon the relations of the United States and of the several States to each other, and to the citizens of the states and of the United States, have been before this court during the official life of any of its present members. We have given every opportunity for a full hearing at the bar; we have discussed it freely and compared views among ourselves; we have taken ample time for careful deliberation, and we now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither the inclination nor the right to go.”
—Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1873)


“The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a state is clearly recognized and established. . . .

It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual.*

We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this Amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several states. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs, rests wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is the same and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same.” —Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 73-74 (1873)

[*Note this justice is scrupulously avoiding the actual defect and cause of Harm: the black race was deemed by fallacy alone, inferior to the white races, and as such, the black race was held to have no cultural qualities which gave them equal social standing, and thus, no claim to inalienable Rights. The 14th amendment had one purpose, but failed this purpose by avoiding the defect, the inherent cultural bias in all social contracts to deny both unalienable rights,  and the inalienable rights to promote an inferior, alienable status by granting of rights. Another absurdity results here which I will explain further on….

—Inalienable rights: Rights which are not capable of being surrendered or transferred without the consent of the one possessing such rights. Morrison v. State, Mo. App., 252 S.W.2d 97, 101.

—It is implied that an individual can surrender, sell or transfer inalienable rights, if consent, is either actually or constructively given. Many hold that Inalienable rights are not inherent in man, thus unnatural, and therefore, can be alienated by governments.

All persons under the 14th amendment have only inferior, alienable rights. That includes corporations as artificial citizens. The absurdity here is for the black race nothing has changed where it is most important. The recognition of them having the same unalienable rights as in We the People. The very reason for them being chosen for slaves was due to the extreme differences in culture and thus distance, as a measure of clan relationships. No law can change this difference only remove the obstacles which interfere with its progressive resolution.

—Only living Men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,-‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;’ and to ‘secure,’ not grant or create, these rights, governments are instituted to defend those Rights.]

Returning to the Wikipedia entry:

Miller believed that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, “All persons born and naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State where they reside” differentiated between two citizenships, one of the United States and one of the state. Furthermore, the second sentence forbidding states from making “any law which shall abridge,” only applied to federal rights alone.[9] Thus, the “privileges and immunities” clause in the constitution only protected rights guaranteed by the United States, not by individual states. As author Jack Beatty put it, these rights included “access to ports and navigable waterways, the ability to run for federal office, and to be protected while on the high seas… they did not include what we call ‘civil rights.'”[10]

Miller argues that if the privileges or immunities clause protected the civil rights of citizens of a state from that state, then the 14th amendment would in essence be granting to the Federal government the power to protect all civil rights that had previously been protected by the states, and that “in the absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt,” this was too radical a change to be within the scope of the 14th amendment.

He asks, “Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress Shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire/sup domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States?

All this and more must follow if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be sound…. [T]he effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character….  We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them.”
—Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1873)

Justice Stephen J. Field later wrote that Miller’s opinion effectively rendered the Fourteenth Amendment a “vain and idle enactment.”[11]

Field, joined by three other justices, wrote an influential dissent in which he accepted Campbell’s reading of the amendment as not confined to protection of freed slaves, but rather as embracing the common law presumption in favor of an individual right to pursue a legitimate occupation. [Black men had to have the right to work or they remain slaves regardless of their citizen status.] Field’s reading of the due process clause of the amendment would prevail in future cases in which the court read the amendment broadly to protect property interests against hostile state laws. [But oddly enough not against the federal government doing far worse against the whole of the Nation?]

Subsequent developments:

The victory of the Crescent City Company was short-lived, surviving the ruling above by only 11 years. By 1879, the State of Louisiana had adopted a new constitution that prohibited the state’s ability to grant slaughterhouse monopolies, devolving regulation of cattle slaughter to the parishes and municipalities, and further banning those subordinate governmental units from granting monopoly rights over such activities. Having essentially lost their monopoly protection, the Crescent City Co. sued. That case ended in Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. (1884),[12] with the U.S. Supreme Court holding that Crescent City Co. did not have a contract with the state, and that revocation of the monopoly privilege was not a violation of the Contract Clause.


Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe writes that “the Slaughter-House Cases incorrectly gutted the *Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Similarly, Yale law professor Akhil Amar has written, “Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that Slaughter-House is a plausible reading of the Fourteenth Amendment.”[13]

[*The Privileges and Immunities Clauses are found in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. Both clauses apply only to citizens of the United States. Aliens and corporations are not citizens and, therefore, are not entitled to this protection. These clauses have proven to be of little import because other constitutional provisions have been used to settle controversies. In large part the insignificance of the clauses has been based on restrictive readings of the clauses by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Article IV provides that “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities in the several states.The purpose of the clause was to facilitate the unification of the independent states into one nation so that citizens traveling throughout the country would receive the same treatment as the citizens of the states through which they passed.

[Note that it was centered on the principle that travel through another state, did not diminish the inherent Rights, already enjoyed by the citizen.]

The privileges and immunities that are protected under Article IV include the right to receive protection from state government; the right to acquire and possess all kinds of property; the right to travel through or reside in any state for purposes of trade, agriculture, or professional endeavors; the right to claim the benefit of the writ of Habeas Corpus; the right to sue and defend actions in court; and the right to receive the same tax treatment as that of the citizens of the taxing state.

This clause forbids a state from unjustly depriving citizens from other states of any rights derived from state citizenship solely on the basis of non-residence. Yet the Supreme Court has never interpreted it to preclude all deferential treatment of in-state citizens. As a result, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not bar differential state standards governing the practice of certain professions. Out-of-state doctors, lawyers, and other professionals may be required to prove their competency based on standards that are higher than those applied to their in-state counterparts. Tuition rates at public Colleges and Universities are typically lower for in-state students. Out-of-state residents are charged more for hunting and fishing licenses than are in-state residents. Such discrepancies are generally accepted as justifiable because they advance legitimate state interests.

The Supreme Court has struck down state laws that infringed rights guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 57 L. Ed. 2d 397 (1978), the Court ruled that the state of Alaska failed to show a reasonable purpose for a state law that required employers to give a hiring preference to in-state residents who applied to work on the construction of oil or gas pipelines.

However, the Supreme Court has rarely used the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV to invalidate discriminatory laws. The due process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are commonly applied to determine the validity of state laws that unjustly discriminate between residents and nonresidents of a state. [And here again the Feds do not apply the same standards to themselves?]

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause has virtually no significance in Civil Rights law. The clause states, “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” This clause protects a person’s rights as a citizen of the United States from unreasonable State Action or interference. [Does it protect State citizens from federal trespass of their Rights?]

The privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship that cannot be unreasonably abridged by state laws include the right to travel from state to state; the right to vote for federal officeholders; the right to enter public lands; the right to petition Congress to redress grievances; the right to inform the national government of a violation of its laws; the right to receive protection from violence when in federal custody; the right to have free access to U.S. seaports; the right to transact business with and engage in administering the functions of the U.S. government; the right to have access to federal courts; and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

[Every one of these grants of alienable rights is strictly caused by the black race having no equal standing in the original Declaration. They were denied inclusion to be kept as slaves and now they are swept under the 14th in a protected class of inferior rights— or why state what alienable rights they now must be given by the Union States? There are no other people needing this protection despite the broad rulings, which only call to question why the original rights need any protections at all? Did not the Declaration, prove once and for all, these unalienable rights, coupled with inalienable Rights, are not subject to legislation, without violating the Sovereign purpose of them both as declared? Congress was given an inch and instead deemed it to be a mile. Men shed blood and died for those Rights, thus Congress, which cannot shed a single drop of warm blood has no standing with those that do– therefore,  has no authority to even question them.  Taxing the property of a mans labor is more than just an insult; it is constitutional blasphemy of a treasonous nature.]

Another review of the case: The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1873). The case involved a Louisiana state law that gave one meat company the exclusive right to slaughter livestock in New Orleans. Other packing companies were required to pay a fee for using the slaughterhouses. These companies filed suit, claiming that the law violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court upheld the Louisiana Monopoly law, ruling that the Privileges and Immunities Clause had limited effect because it reached only privileges and immunities guaranteed by U.S. citizenship, not state citizenship. Because the law in question dealt with states’ rights, the Fourteenth Amendment had no effect. The Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to grant former slaves *legal equality, not to grant expanded rights to the general population.

In addition, the Court was concerned that a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would give too much power to the federal government and distort the concept of Federalism, which grants the states a large measure of power and autonomy.

The Court has consistently followed the restrictive interpretation given the Privileges and Immunities Clause by this decision. The clause has little significance today in invalidating state statutes that present a constitutional question. When state laws infringe the fundamental rights of U.S. citizenship, the Court usually invokes the Equal Protection Clause to analyze the constitutionality of the state action.

However, the Supreme Court has used the Privileges and Immunities Clauses in two recent cases. In Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 118 S.Ct. 766, 139 L.Ed.2d 717 (1998), the Court ruled that a New York tax law that effectively denied only nonresident taxpayers an Income Tax deduction for Alimony paid violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In Saenz v. Doe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), the Court struck down a California law that limited new residents to the Welfare benefits they would have received in the state of their prior residence. It based its decision in part on the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Justice John Paul Stevens stated that the right to travel is protected “not only by the new arrival’s status as a state citizen, but also by her status as citizen of the United States.” The Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed the right of a citizen to “become a citizen of any State of the Union.” It did not permit the states to “select their citizens.”

This ruling seems to contradict the previous position that the Supreme Court has never interpreted PI clause to preclude all deferential treatment of in-state citizens.  The woman did not live in the state, but was on welfare in another and moved to the state simply to enjoy a better welfare way of life. Not quite the same as merely passing through and receiving bad treatment due to being a nonresident.

The slaves were free sure, but the hostility to them was quite severe and not just in the South– all across the nation— consequences of that original defect took another turn of the absurd— no other non slave state was responsible for the tragedy of the South— or the defective principles of those who claimed slavery as a Right, as a part of their Culture. People simply did not want blacks in their social group.  The 14th did absolutely nothing to resolve that fact, or the animosity so ingrained. The rigid social orders were just as rigid as before as human nature had not changed one iota. Law cannot change this aspect of human behavior. The unalienable rights are preserved in the social order from which they arise. Former slaves that were able to establish themselves with equal ability with economic counter-parts had a better chance of being accepted than those who had no such ambitions.

The brutal take-down of the Southern Culture, imploded the souths economy and laid to waste any chance of peaceful resolution. This was the intended goal of the Northern elite establishment, to wipe out the competition for the upper-hand of the most privileged class and to ensure the supply of wage-slaves for their growing factories which would also have plenty of tenants in the company towns. The war on the South was un-necessary to stop the slavery of other human beings. Most un-biased historical records claim it was already waning even before the 13th was passed. The real culprits were citizens of the Crown.

Without the blessings of the heads of Europe, slavery as an institution was quite impossible. If there was no market, for the  raw materials derived from slave plantations,  no southern man could afford them [slaves] in the first place. The economic wheel of profit decided who gained and who suffered poverty. The greater wheel was parked in the great fortunes of Europe, especially the city of London. Slaves were considered to be live-stock just like cattle. By most accounts they were treated better than white indentured servants.  Behind the scenes as always, the banking syndicate operating out of the City of London, needed this critical break-down of culture into hostilities to once again drive a deep wedge into the most vulnerable aspects of the nations financial interests. War after all is a racket. A debt racket which thrives on blood-shed and mayhem. The civil war produced both in great measure.

From Wikipedia:  In 1821, with the aim of establishing a self-sufficient colony for emancipated American survivors of slavery, something that had already been accomplished in Freetown, the first settlers arrived in Africa from the United States, under the auspices of the American Colonization Society. They landed at Sherbro Island in present-day Sierra Leone. The undertaking was a shambles and many settlers died. In 1822, a second ship rescued the settlers and took them to Cape Mesurado, establishing the settlement of Christopolis. In 1824, the city was renamed to Monrovia after James Monroe, then President of the United States, and a prominent supporter of the colony in sending freed Black slaves to Liberia, saw it as preferable than emancipation in America.[citation needed]

In 1845, Monrovia was the site of the constitutional convention held by the American Colonization Society which drafted the constitution that would two years later be the constitution of an independent and sovereign Republic of Liberia.[3]”

While many critics derided this effort to help blacks start a new life it was at least a consideration to be explored as viable as any other available to blacks during this time. Racial strife is exasperated by poor economic conditions which pit people of marginal resources against one another for survival. The 14th amendment also did very little to change the ugly truth of this reality. Meanwhile, the inclusion of corporations under the 14th without a proper precedence went un-challenged.

On the issue of corporations as persons under the 14th amendment:

“At the California Constitutional Convention of 1878–79, the state legislature drew up a new constitution that denied railroads “the right to deduct the amount of their debts [i.e., mortgages] from the taxable value of their property, a right which was given to individuals.”[1] Southern Pacific Railroad Company refused to pay taxes under these new changes. The taxpaying railroads challenged this law, based on a conflicting federal statute of 1866 which gave them privileges inconsistent with state taxation. (14 Stat. 292, §§ 1, 2, 3, 11, 18).

San Mateo County, along with neighboring counties, filed suit against the railroads to recoup the massive losses in tax revenue stemming from Southern Pacific’s refusal to pay. After hearing arguments in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the California Supreme Court sided with the county. Using the *Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, a law created so black litigants could bypass hostile southern state courts if they were denied justice, Southern Pacific was able to appeal all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.[2]

{From Wikipedia—*After the Supreme Court of the United States in 1874 overturned the removal provisions in two recent acts, Representative Luke Poland of Vermont introduced legislation to restore the right of removal in all civil cases in which one of the defendants was a citizen of a state other than that in which the suit was filed. Although the House rejected this modest extension of removal and passed a bill to make only minor revisions in the law, Senator Matthew Carpenter of Wisconsin proposed amendments to grant full federal jurisdiction to the United States circuit courts and guarantee the right of removal in any civil case arising under federal law or in which there was diversity of citizenship, with the $500 threshold applying to both categories of cases. The United States House of Representatives accepted that version of the bill, which President Ulysses S. Grant signed into law in March 1875.

By 1875, the members of Congress who supported full federal jurisdiction and a broad right of removal from the state courts were concerned less with the protection of freed slaves and white Unionists in the South than with the advancement of business interests that were often obstructed by state courts. The debate in Congress focused on the growing significance of interstate commerce and the economic benefits of a uniform system of justice. Although this broad redefinition of federal jurisdiction prompted surprisingly little comment at the time, the act of 1875 attracted new types of litigation that swelled the caseload of the federal courts and challenged the existing organization of the judiciary.}

The court reporter, former president of the Newburgh and New York Railway Company, J.C. Bancroft Davis, wrote the following as part of the headnote for the case:

“One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that  corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.‘ Before argument, Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.”[4]

In other words, the *headnote claimed that all of the justices believed that corporations enjoyed rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868.[5] In fact, the headnote was only a reporting by the Court Reporter of the Chief Justice’s personal interpretation of the Justices’ opinions. The issue of applicability of “Equal Protection to any persons” to the railroads was not [specifically] addressed in the decision of the Court in the case. And was never actually ruled upon period.

In his dissent in the 1938 case of Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson, Justice Hugo Black wrote “in 1886, this Court in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, decided for the first time that the word ‘person’ in the amendment did in some instances include corporations. […] The history of the amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control of state governments. […] The language of the amendment itself does not support the theory that it was passed for the benefit of corporations.”[11]

Justice William O. Douglas wrote in 1949, “the Santa Clara case becomes one of the most momentous of all our decisions. […] Corporations were now armed with constitutional prerogatives.”

And the black man was pushed aside once again, as if, the cultural bias was indeed already solved. That would be the essential question of “Natural Liberty” versus the slave who has no such liberties period.

“Up until the New Deal, many laws regulating corporations were struck down under the “equal protection” clause of the 14th Amendment–in fact, that clause was invoked far more often on behalf of corporations than former slaves. Although the doctrine of personhood has been weakened since, even now lawyers argue that an attempt to sue a corporation for lying is an unconstitutional infringement on its First Amendment right to free speech.” (This year, for example, we saw Nike v. Kasky.) http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/2469/how-can-a-corporation-be-legally-considered-a-person

The actual Supreme Court case can be found here:


“In 1886, . . . in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a private corporation is a person and entitled to the legal rights and protections the Constitutions affords to any person. Because the Constitution makes no mention of corporations, it is a fairly clear case of the Court’s taking it upon itself to rewrite the Constitution.

Far more remarkable, however, is that the doctrine of corporate personhood, which subsequently became a cornerstone of corporate law, was introduced into this 1886 decision without argument.

According to the official case record, Supreme Court Justice Morrison Remick Waite simply pronounced before the beginning of argument in the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”

The court reporter duly entered into the summary record of the Court’s findings that “The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in section 1 of the Fourteen Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Thus it was that a two-sentence assertion by a single judge *[as reported as a footnote normally not included] elevated corporations to the status of persons under the law, prepared the way for the rise of global corporate rule, and thereby changed the course of history.

The doctrine of corporate personhood creates an interesting legal contradiction. The corporation is owned by its shareholders and is therefore their property. If it is also a legal person, then it is a person owned by others and thus exists in a condition of slavery — a status explicitly forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. So is a corporation a person illegally held in servitude by its shareholders? Or is it a person who enjoys the rights of personhood that take precedence over the presumed ownership rights of its shareholders? So far as I have been able to determine, this contradiction has not been directly addressed by the courts.”

A very interesting set of questions of which I have a few more: If the corporation is not a person— before the 14th, as no such artificial entities are recognized as persons period in the Constitution— such artificial things can only have alienable rights—- as they have no mind to speak their own thoughts, thus fail the litmus test for any other right so granted by distinction, plus that they are not found in Nature and have no claim of any such natural Right. The corporation cannot be an equal to any Living man, whose life expresses that which a corporation cannot, nor can any living man be defined by such an artificial status, as no constitutional authority exists to De-evolve the living people into inanimate objects for the purpose of simply granting inferior legal rights... the absurdity in question is that the 14th by falsely including corporations, by implied virtue of fiat alone, destroyed the actual purpose of the 14th by placing the black race into a classification which makes them no better than artificial objects of law.  Or  conversely, corporations have no standing as their equals or similar Rights, as living beings, and therefore, cannot claim the shelter rule period.

The citizens of the States not encumbered by the defect of slavery, cannot be included into a classification which subverts the very meaning of “sovereign citizen” while placing the citizen into a relationship which violates the Due Process clause[stripped away unalienable rights] and the Privileges and Immunities Clause[same reason but inalienable rights], by simply ignoring the  substantive difference of such Rights, as previously acknowledged by the constitution, as beyond the subject control of congress, therefore, cannot be subject to the Jurisdiction of the federal which is NOT a State unto itself. The transfer of citizens into a District is absurd by the actual construction of federal jurisdictions. However, this distinction was blurred by claiming two citizens exist as one person, despite the fact, no individual except former slaves were in need of such a protection due to the absolute absence of unalienable rights. The remedy was wrong and the 14th was shoved down the States, by military imposition violating the constitution by impeding their Rights as citizens.

“The 39th United States Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment on June 13, 1866.

Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was bitterly contested: all the Southern state legislatures, with the exception of Tennessee, refused to ratify the amendment. This refusal led to the passage of the Reconstruction Acts. Ignoring the existing state governments, military government was imposed until new civil governments were established and the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”[64]

The other question which is stupendously avoided is why a corporation has any Right to challenge a Sovereign State law? If the railroad barons did not like the States laws they were free to conduct their business elsewhere. As individuals they might have challenged the changing of the law to extract taxes otherwise not due. Instead, a second absurdity resulted when the non-person lost the case and used a false “implied” shelter to challenge the law where the feds had no original jurisdiction, or the court venue was never correct. A State law which was not impeding, “Natural inalienable Liberties” of a non-person was challenged as if it did…. the corporation did not have inalienable rights, which to be true would have required the State to have already recognized such a Right in the States constitutions before the suit was brought. Only then might have the question arose naturally if that right was violated by changing the law to increase the tax revenue unfairly by singling out the railroads in question and no other so allowed to do business in the State of California. 

The suit was not found in favor of the railroad, but the issue was not about persons it was about taxes un-fairly assessed on fences. Which is what the Supreme court actually found to be true and in the R. R’s favor. The absurdity is without the trick the court by its silence actually proves the opposite. A corporation cannot be anything, but what it is by nature– strictly artificial and of no rights… or let it speak for itself. That which has Natural law speaks of the law for itself— that is our nature and it is unalienable.

Back to that amazing list from the gemstone site:

“Burlamaqui (Politic c. #, . 15) defines natural liberty as “the right which nature gives to all mankind of disposing of their persons and property after the manner they may judge most consonant to their happiness, on condition of their acting within the limits of the law of nature, and so as not to interfere with an equal exercise of the same rights by other men;” and therefore it has been justly said, that “absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security–the right of personal liberty–and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered and frequently declared by the people of this country to be natural, inherent, and unalienable.” Potter’s Dwarris, ch. 13, p. 429.

(“[T]he Due Process Clause protects [the unalienable liberty recognized in the Declaration of Independence] rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.” SANDIN v. CONNER, U.S. (1995)

“In the second article of the Declaration of Rights, which was made part of the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is declared:

     ‘That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding; and that no man ought or of right can be compelled, to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent; nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be, vested in, or assumed, by any power whatever, that shall, in any case, interfere with, or in any manner controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship.’ (Dec. of Rights, Art. 2.). . .

     (The Judge then read the 1st. 8th. and 11th articles of the Declaration of Rights; and the 9th. and 46th sections of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. See 1 Vol. Dall. Edit. Penn. Laws p. 55. 6. 60. in the Appendix.) From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law. . .

The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property is natural, inherent, and unalienable. It is a right not ex gratia from the legislature, but *ex debito from the constitution. VANHORNE’S LESSEE v. DORRANCE, 2 U.S. 304 (1795)

*ex debito: of or by reason of an obligation of justice : as a matter of right

I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights.

It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations. . . It demeans the holding in Morrissey – more importantly it demeans the concept of liberty itself – to ascribe to that holding nothing more than a protection of an interest that the State has created through its own prison regulations. For if the inmate’s protected liberty interests are no greater than the State chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases. I think it clear that even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty – at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity – which the Constitution may never ignore. MEACHUM v. FANO, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)

All commissions (regardless of their form, or by whom issued) contain, impliedly, the constitutional reservation, that the people at any time have the right, through their representatives, to alter, reform, or abolish the office, as they may alter, if they choose, the whole form of government.

“In our Magna Carta it is proclaimed (2d section of the Bill of Rights, under the 9th Article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania), that ‘all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of these ends they have at all times an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper.’ It has been well said, by one of the ablest judges of the age, that ‘a constitution is not to receive a technical construction, like a common law instrument or a statute. It is to be interpreted so as to carry out the great principles of the government, not to defeat them.’ Per Gibson, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.), 133. BUTLER v. COM. OF PENNSYLVANIA, 51 U.S. 402 (1850)

“The rights of life and personal liberty are natural rights of man. ‘To secure these rights,’ says the Declaration of Independence, ‘governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

“The very highest duty of the States, when they entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to protect all persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these ‘unalienable rights’ with which they were endowed by their Creator.” Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States. It is no more the duty or within the power of the United States to punish for a conspiracy to falsely imprison or murder within a State, than it would be to punish for false imprisonment or murder itself.” U S v. CRUIKSHANK, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)

“. . . The question presented is not whether the United States has the power to condemn and appropriate this property of the Monongahela Company, for that is conceded, but how much it must pay as compensation therefor. Obviously, this question, as all others which run along the line of the extent of the protection the individual has under the Constitution against the demands of the government, is of importance; for in any society the fullness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value of the government.

The first ten amendments to the Constitution, adopted as they were soon after the adoption of the Constitution, are in the nature of a bill of rights, and were adopted in order to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable rights.” UNITED STATES v. TWIN CITY POWER CO., 350 U.S. 222 (1956)

“‘By the common law, the king as parens patriae owned the soil under all the waters of all navigable rivers or arms of the sea where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, including the shore or bank to high- water mark. … He held these rights, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his subjects at large, who were entitled to the free use of the sea, and all tide waters, for the purposes of navigation, fishing, etc., subject to such regulations and restrictions as the crown or the Parliament might prescribe.

By Magna Carta, and many subsequent statutes, the powers of the king are limited, and he cannot now deprive his subjects of these rights by granting the public navigable waters to individuals. But there can be no doubt of the right of Parliament in England, or the Legislature of this state, to make such grants, when they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular individuals. The right to navigate the public waters of the state and to fish therein, and the right to use the public highways, are all public rights belonging to the people at large. They are not the private unalienable rights of each individual. Hence the Legislature as the representatives of the public may restrict and regulate the exercise of those rights in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial to the public at large: Provided they do not interfere with vested rights which have been granted to individuals.'” APPLEBY v. CITY OF NEW YORK, 271 U.S. 364 (1926)

Elliot’s Debates on the Federal Constitution (1876) 319 et seq. In ratifying the Constitution the following declarations were made:

New Hampshire, p. 326, ‘XI. Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or to infringe the rights of conscience.’ Virginia, p. 327, ‘… no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the Congress, by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those purposes; and that among other essential rights, the liberty of conscience, and of the press, cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by any authority of the United States.’ New York, p. 328, ‘That the freedom of the press ought not to be violated or restrained.’ 

After the submission of the amendments, Rhode Island ratified and declared, pp. 334, 335, ‘IV. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, and not by force and violence; and therefore all men have a natural, equal, and unalienable right to the exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience; and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others. … XVI. That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments. That freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated.’ JONES v. CITY OF OPELIKA, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)

“As to the objections made on the other side to our interpretation of the compact, that it impugns the right to the pursuit of happiness, which is inherent in every society of men, and is incompatible with these unalienable rights of sovereignty and of self-government, which every independent State must possess, the answer is obvious: that no people has a right to pursue its own happiness to the injury of others, for whose protection solemn compacts, like the present, have been made. It is a trite maxim, that man gives up a part of his natural liberty when he enters into civil society, as the price of the blessings of that state: and it may be said, with truth, this liberty is well exchanged for the advantages which flow from law and justice.” GREEN v. BIDDLE, 21 U.S. 1 (1821)

“This court said, in the case of The Bank of Columbia v. Okely (4 Wheat. 235), in speaking of a summary proceeding given by the charter of that bank for the collection of its debts:

     ‘It is the remedy, and not the right, and as such we have no doubt of its being subject to the will of Congress. The forms of administering justice, and the duties and powers of courts as incident to the exercise of a branch of sovereign power, must ever be subject to legislative will, and the power over them is unalienable, so as to bind subsequent legislatures.’

     And in Young v. The Bank of Alexandria (4 Cranch, 397), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall says:

      ‘There is a difference between those rights on which the validity of the transactions of the corporation depends, which must adhere to those transactions everywhere, and those peculiar remedies which may be bestowed on it. The first are of general obligation; the last, from their nature, can only be exercised in those courts which the power making the grant can regulate.’ See also The Commonwealth v. The Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. et al., 43 Pa. St. 227; State of Maryland v. Northern Central Railroad Co., 18 Md. 193; Colby v. Dennis, 36 Me. 1; Gowan v. Penobscot Railroad Co., 44 id. 140. U.S. v. UNION PAC. R. CO., 98 U.S. 569 (1878)

“It is significant that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press falls between the religious guarantees and the guarantee of the right to petition for redress of grievances in the text of the First Amendment, the principles of which are carried to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. It partakes of the nature of both, for it is as much a guarantee to individuals of their personal right to make their thoughts public and put them before the community, see Holt, Of the Liberty of the Press, in Nelson, Freedom of the Press from Hamilton to the Warren Court 18-19, as it is a social necessity required for the “maintenance of our political system and an open society.” Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, at 389.

It is because of the personal nature of this right that we have rejected all manner of prior restraint on publication, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, despite strong arguments that if the material was unprotected the time of suppression was immaterial. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640. The dissemination of the individual’s opinions on matters of public interest is for us, in the historic words of the Declaration of Independence, an “unalienable right” that “governments are instituted among men to secure.

History shows us that the Founders were not always convinced that unlimited discussion of public issues would be “for the benefit of all of us”13 but that they firmly adhered to the proposition that the “true liberty of the press” permitted “every man to publish his opinion.” Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa.). CURTIS PUBLISHING CO. v. BUTTS, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)

I too stand on this fundamental, unalienable Right in publishing this Blog, which every alternative source of news or opinion is so protected from incursions of political demands or restrictions. If I were to sell my inalienable rights to my writings as property another writer would then take my place and the Blog accordingly. If I had only an alienable right the government could come to my door and demand my immediate cessation of writing and if I did not comply— off to the fed house I go. The differences are easy to understand, but the complexity arises as to how they are applied to the various qualities of property both real and imagined.

When the banking syndicate set up its phony federal reserve– to sell the nation what it already owned— to start up a scam centered on stocks—- the great swindle began which culminated in the crash— the fundamental relationship between citizens and their governments took a nose-dive into the tar pit of absurdity and a great evil arose. Evil because of all the lives which were needlessly brutalized, and lost for no other reason than to make the ultra-rich more powerful than civil law can explain or justify on sound principle. Congress, was not given the Right to be evil as an enumerated power by Constitutional Consent.

When the Law becomes the means to do great Harm it is evil. Men have no obligation to up-hold any Law that is evil or give respect to the men who pass such laws. Which is why money is used to do the evil and control the people in such a manner they dare not say a word against those that bind them to the grinding wheels of debt. That would be the ugly truth of dependency. There is no law that makes taxpayers out of American citizens. And there is no law that prevents people from knowing the truth. Which is why goons are such a necessary part of the new world order. Look around they are already on the job. They have been here all along. They simply look just like ordinary men. Only when they act like goons do they give themselves away.

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One Response to “What is Left—- When “Rights” Are Gone”

  1. Marvis Says:

    Wonderful website you have here but I was wanting to know if you knew of any community forums that cover the same topics discussed here? I’d really love to be
    a part of online community where I can get feedback from other knowledgeable individuals that share the same interest. If you have any suggestions, please let me know.
    Thanks a lot!


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